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INTRODUCTION 
How much deference should courts afford the executive’s interpre-
tations of statutes and treaties in foreign relations law?  This question 
that has long engaged foreign relations scholars has found new salience 
in recent years, as the courts have been called repeatedly to determine 
the meaning of statutes and treaties bearing on the President’s deten-
tion and trial powers in combating international terrorism.  Among 
courts noting the confusion on this issue are those now attempting to 
address whether and to what extent the executive’s views are relevant in 
interpreting the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the 
statute the President invokes to justify continued detention of terrorist 
suspects at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.1  While the Su-
preme Court has offered some guidance on the scope of the statute,2 
the AUMF itself is silent on the question of detention.  As the courts 
have struggled to choose between two interpretations of the statute—
one put forward by the executive, the other advanced by detainees—
courts have been notably equivocal on the potentially dispositive issue 
of judicial deference:  “The Court does not accept the government’s 
position [on the meaning of the statute] in full, then, even given the 
deference accorded to the Executive in this realm, because it is ulti-
mately the province of the courts to say ‘what the law is’ . . . .”3 
 
1 Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006). 
2 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-19 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding 
that the AUMF permits detention, at a minimum, of individuals who were “‘part of or 
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and 
who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’” there (quoting Brief for 
Respondent at 3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696))).  
3 Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also id. (“Although there is some dis-
agreement regarding the extent of the deference owed the Executive in this setting, it 
is beyond question that some deference is required.”).  The court also cites articles re-
flecting the scholarly debate over deference: 
Compare Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 
116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1220 (2007) (arguing that with respect to the AUMF, “the 
President should be taken to have the authority to interpret ambiguities as he 
chooses”), with Derek Jinks & Neal Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 
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Historically, most scholars have accepted with little question the 
notion that the Court will defer to executive views in core matters of 
foreign relations, particularly where matters of national security are 
concerned.4  Yet on descriptive and normative grounds, the events of 
the past decade have called the prevailing account into question.  In 
treaty interpretation, the Court has invoked a Marbury-based insis-
tence on asserting its own formal interpretive authority.  As the Court 
put it perhaps most dramatically in recent opinions construing the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:  “If treaties are to be given 
effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning 
as a matter of federal law ‘is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department,’ headed by the ‘one supreme Court’ established by 
the Constitution.”5  Likewise, in a series of decisions involving national 
security, the Court has been anything but deferential to the executive’s 
interpretation of the relevant statute or treaty.  In Rasul v. Bush,6 Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld,7 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,8 and Boumediene v. Bush,9 the Court has 
swept aside vigorous arguments by the executive that it refrain from en-
gagement on abstention or political question grounds.  Moreover, the 
Court has scarcely noted any doctrinal tradition of interpretive “defe-
 
YALE L.J. 1230, 1234 (2007) (acknowledging that under existing doctrines defe-
rence is warranted in some circumstances, but arguing that “increased judicial 
deference to the executive in the foreign relations domain is inappropriate”). 
Id. at 69. 
4 See, e.g., Department of Justice Oversight:  Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending 
Against Terrorism:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 162 (2002) 
(statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law 
School) (“[C]ourts necessarily see but one case at a time and in wartime tend to defer 
to the executive’s greater knowledge and expertise . . . .”); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 132 (2d ed. 1996) (“[F]oreign affairs 
make a difference.  Here, the courts are less willing than elsewhere to curb the federal 
political branches, are even more disposed to presume the constitutional validity of 
their actions and to accept their interpretations of statutes, and have even developed 
doctrines of special deference to them.”); Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 
MO. L. REV. 903, 906 & n.14 (2004) (citing various sources).   
5 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353-54 (2006) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) at 177); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008) (rejecting the ex-
ecutive’s argument that a judgment of the International Court of Justice, although not 
binding in courts of its own authority, “became the law of the land with precisely that ef-
fect pursuant to the President’s Memorandum and his power ‘to establish binding rules 
of decision that preempt contrary state law’” (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Medellín, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-0984))). 
6 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (interpreting the federal habeas statute). 
7 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (interpreting the AUMF and the Geneva Conventions). 
8 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (interpreting the Detainee Treatment Act, the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, and the Geneva Conventions). 
9 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (interpreting the Military Commissions Act). 
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rence” on the meaning of the laws.  While descriptive claims that the 
Court invariably defers to the President in foreign relations law inter-
pretation have always been subject to challenge, the Court’s recent be-
havior has made this account increasingly untenable.10 
In the wake of such decisions, scholars have turned renewed at-
tention to the task of identifying a doctrine of “deference” in foreign 
relations law.  Cass Sunstein and Eric Posner, among others, have ex-
pressed the normative concern that the Court, unduly interested in 
“saying what the law is” in an area of questionable judicial compe-
tence, was no longer taking sufficient account of the executive’s supe-
rior expertise and political responsiveness in this realm.11  Others, 
while not necessarily lamenting the less deferential judicial role, have 
focused on the importance of finding some constraining approach 
that would provide interpretive guidance to the courts.12  If there is no 
predictable or sensible way of determining how much attention the 
Court will pay executive views in construing foreign relations law, rule-
of-law interests require, at a minimum, the development of a new un-
derstanding of the judicial relationship to the executive on questions 
of law interpretation.  Responding to such concerns, Sunstein and 
Posner thus joined Curtis Bradley and others in suggesting that courts 
should defer to the executive in cases with “substantial foreign relations 
implications,” just as they do under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.13 in the standard administrative law context.14 
But as this Article contends, Chevron’s promise of resolving the de-
ference question in foreign relations law is almost certainly overstated.  
 
10 See infra Part I.  
11 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3 (arguing that reasonable interpretations by 
the executive of ambiguous statutes should “trump” certain judicial doctrines); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663 (2005) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War] (arguing that presidential action under sta-
tutes authorizing the use of military force should receive considerable deference); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury:  The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 
2580 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Marbury] (expressing approval of judicial 
deference to executive interpretations).  But see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference 
and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 701 (2000) (noting the “substantial deference” 
courts give the executive branch in matters of foreign affairs).  
12 See Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference:  The Judicial Power and Executive 
Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1772-73 (2007) (proposing a model of defe-
rence to executive treaty interpretation that varies based on the circumstances); Jinks 
& Katyal, supra note 3, at 1236-38 (recognizing that while some judicial deference is 
often appropriate, it is not appropriate when international law seeks to constrain the 
executive itself).  
13 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
14 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1217. 
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First, Chevron is not nearly as doctrinally stable as its advocates suggest.  
As a growing set of empirical studies has shown, Chevron has exerted 
anything but a defining hold on Supreme Court treatment of agency 
interpretation of federal laws.  This Article will describe how the con-
temporary Court has regularly avoided applying traditional Chevron de-
ference in what might otherwise have been thought to be circumstances 
described by the core of that doctrine.  Indeed, the Court has ignored 
Chevron as a useful interpretive guide in recent foreign relations cases in 
which it might most readily be implicated.15  At the same time, while 
one of the most important functional rationales for embracing Chevron 
in the foreign relations context is said to be the doctrine’s ability to take 
account of the executive’s superior expertise, Chevron is, in key respects, 
a blunt tool for ensuring that expertise is taken into account in law in-
terpretation.  An agency administrator in principle enjoys deference 
under Chevron whether or not the administrator has actually included 
the relevant agency experts in the analysis.  If one accepts the view that 
the executive’s key strength is its expertise on certain questions arising 
in foreign relations, one would presumably wish to insist that the actual 
experts inside the executive branch be consulted.  If expertise matters, 
there may be more effective ways of ensuring its inclusion than review 
for generalized “reasonableness” of “executive” interpretation. 
Beyond this, the wholesale importation of Chevron into foreign re-
lations law poses another problem.  As Chevron’s critics have empha-
sized since soon after the decision came down, Chevron appears to be 
in tension with the Court’s formal constitutional power under Article 
III, which has at its core the duty to “say what the law is.”16  When the 
Court does something less than determine for itself what the law is, 
the argument goes, it is ceding power that the Framers of the Consti-
tution intended to reserve to the Article III courts.17  While adminis-
trative law scholars have grappled with this problem for decades, it has 
been surprisingly absent from the contemporary foreign relations law 
debate.  Yet importing Chevron into the foreign relations setting with-
out attempting to address the issue only perpetuates the formal di-
lemma.  Particularly because the formal allocation of foreign relations 
power between the judicial and executive branches—unlike the rather 
more novel authority of administrative agencies—is an express subject 
 
15 See infra subsection I.B.2. 
16 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
17 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 525 (1989) (arguing that Chevron poses a 
challenge to the separation of powers). 
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of constitutional concern, it seems essential to have some formal 
theory of how interpretive power may be shared in this realm before 
designing a deference doctrine that effectively shares it.  At what point 
does a pretermission of the judicial interpretive inquiry—in favor of the 
executive’s meaning—chip away at a formal authority the Constitution 
otherwise grants to the courts?  Once a “case or controversy” is properly 
before an Article III court, is there a formal floor of judicial power to 
interpret statutes and treaties, beneath which no functional deference 
rationale can justify allowing the court to sink?  Without some more de-
veloped understanding of what is meant by the “judicial power” in for-
eign relations law, it is premature to settle on a deference regime that 
may have the court adjusting its approach to law interpretation.  This 
Article begins exploring answers to these questions of formal power. 
Part I engages the current debate over judicial deference in foreign 
relations interpretation.  While embracing the need for greater clarity, 
it argues that importing Chevron into foreign relations law is an unsatis-
fying solution.  Part II then takes up the problem of formal judicial 
power in detail, considering first the two leading accounts of the “judi-
cial power” in statutory interpretation.  The first model, still perhaps 
the dominant understanding of the courts’ role in statutory interpreta-
tion, known as “faithful agent” theory, sees the relationship between 
Congress and the courts as that of principal and agent, where the judi-
cial agent’s duty is limited to attempting to discern and accurately apply 
the directions of the legislative principal set forth in statute.18  Yet as will 
be discussed, faithful agent theory seems unlikely to fully explain the 
judicial role in foreign relations law.  In statutory interpretation, it is not 
immediately clear that it leaves room for an executive interpretive role 
of any sort.  For treaty interpretation, faithful agent theory’s utility is 
even more suspect.  Treaties, of course, are not concluded by the legis-
lature alone, but are “ma[d]e” by the executive, “by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.”19  Indeed, the U.S. executive and Senate are 
not the sole lawmakers involved in making treaties; foreign treaty part-
ners help conceive, negotiate, and draft the legal text.20  In this context, 
 
18 See infra Section II.A.  
19 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
20 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that treaties should be interpreted by looking to the actions 
and pertinent agreements made by all the parties of the treaty); Sumitomo Shoji Am., 
Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 183-85 (1982) (attending to the views of both the Unit-
ed States and Japan in interpreting the terms of a Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion Treaty between the parties). 
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it seems problematic at best to view the U.S. executive as the sole “prin-
cipal” lawmaker whose intent the Court must discern. 
A second model of the judicial power, commonly called “instru-
mental theory,” is somewhat more promising.  It holds that Article III 
courts were created not to be mere agents of Congress, but rather to 
employ quintessentially judicial canons of interpretation and methods 
of legal reasoning that will both help to clarify ambiguous texts and 
influence legislative drafting over time.21  Yet while instrumental 
theory adds much value to the question of judicial power in foreign 
relations law, it too leaves central questions about the relationship be-
tween the interpretive power of the courts and the executive unans-
wered.  Instrumental theory’s relative silence on the role of normative 
canons of statutory construction22—for example, an avoidance canon 
that requires a clear statement before rendering an interpretation that 
has the effect of delegating power from one branch to another—
leaves unsettled one of the central questions in foreign relations law:  
whether interpretive canons of constitutional stature still apply.23  
Likewise, it seems hard to believe that the judicial power in treaty in-
terpretation hinges on the expectation that interpretive practices pur-
sued by the U.S. judiciary alone are meant to have a clear impact on 
treaty drafting over time.  While the U.S. executive certainly has some 
incentive to take Supreme Court interpretive expectations into ac-
count in negotiating treaty texts, the United States’ system is but one 
judicial system among many in multilateral treaty interpretation.  For-
eign courts are hardly bound by the interpretive guidance of the U.S. 
high court, and our treaty partners may have their own domestic in-
terpretive demands to fulfill.  Under the circumstances, it would seem 
 
21 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 116-
18 (1994) (discussing the belief of the Framers of the Constitution in judicial engage-
ment in interpretation); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative 
State:  Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) (arguing that judicial influence over legislative behavior is “an im-
portant component of the Founders’ constitutional design”). 
22 A number of scholars have discussed the role of so-called normative canons in sta-
tutory interpretation.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law:  Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 
598 (1992) (“A good many of the substantive canons of statutory construction are directly 
inspired by the Constitution . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Che-
vron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2111 (1990) (“By using these principles, courts decide 
cases of statutory meaning by reference to something external to legislative desires . . . .”). 
23 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War 
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2103-06 (2005) (arguing against a clear statement 
requirement on delegation grounds in interpreting the AUMF). 
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surprising if instrumental influence of this sort were the sole, or even 
primary, expected judicial function in treaty interpretation. 
Given these deficiencies, this Article turns in Part III to offer a 
separate, supplemental understanding of the judicial power in foreign 
relations law.  Here called equilibrium theory, the model this Article 
explores draws on historic justifications for judicial supremacy over 
constitutional interpretation to propose that part of the judicial role in 
statutory and treaty interpretation is to aid in maintaining a structural 
balance of power.24  As Monaghan has noted, “Marshall’s grand con-
ception of judicial autonomy in law declaration was not in terms or in 
logic limited to constitutional interpretation.”25  And while the most 
sweeping conceptions of judicial power to independently “say what 
the law is”26 could not survive the modern administrative state, it is a 
mistake to understand this transformation as the end of the Court’s 
role in structural power balancing.  The Framers’ vision of separated 
branches, as post-Chevron critics have suggested, was of a government 
of shared authority, each branch with enough constitutional power 
“‘to resist encroachments of the others.’”27  Serving the demands of 
functional effectiveness by allowing one branch to accrue greater au-
thority over time may be permissible as long as the other branches can 
respond with equal and opposite constraining force of their own.  
Delegation could be tolerated, but only because it was possible to 
maintain an offsetting power through judicial review.28  In this view, to 
the extent a doctrine of deference disables the courts from helping to 
maintain that system of “dynamic equilibrium,”29 it impermissibly en-
croaches on the structural mandate of the judicial power. 
Such an understanding of the judicial power contributes to our ap-
proach to deference in statutory and treaty interpretation in several 
ways.  First, there is nothing in equilibrium theory that would preclude 
the consideration of an executive branch interpretation of a law, par-
ticularly insofar as the executive may enjoy functional advantages in ex-
pertise that might clarify legislative meaning, or insofar as the executive 
 
24 See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 33 (1983) (describing Marbury’s understanding of the “judicial power” over 
interpretation).  
25 Id. at 2. 
26 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
27 Farina, supra note 17, at 496-97 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James 
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
28 See id. at 487 (explaining how judicial review can help check excessive delega-
tions of power). 
29 Id. at 497. 
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has a relevant formal role (i.e., to “make” treaties).  There would, how-
ever, be an expectation in statutory interpretation that the Court would 
apply substantive interpretive canons geared toward limiting excessive 
delegations of power and disfavor interpretations that disable any one 
branch from continued participation in a deliberative dialogue.  And 
there would be a corresponding expectation in treaty interpretation—
an expectation that domestic judicial power would function, at least at 
the interpretive margins, to push back against the tendency in interna-
tional law and legal structures to aggrandize power for executives within 
domestic legal systems.30  As a result, an equilibrium theory understand-
ing of the limits of judicial deference has direct implications for the in-
terpretation of statutes like the AUMF, a statute whose meaning is in-
formed by international law and so occupies the courts today.31 
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to say a word about what the 
field “foreign relations law” is meant here to describe.  The term itself 
may be most commonly read to capture a set of cases involving disputes 
or other engagements between the United States and other nations.  
Cases involving treaty interpretation thus seem centrally implicated.  At 
the same time, most scholars in the field recognize that certain ques-
tions of statutory interpretation might also fall within the “foreign rela-
tions” rubric—particularly statutes implicating special functional 
strengths of the executive branch and statutes seeming to implicate the 
executive’s own formal constitutional role.32  Given both the potential 
breadth and the uncertain stability of such a category, a deference doc-
trine intended for the (said) peculiar demands of foreign relations law 
might easily become the exception that swallows the rule.  Be that as it 
may, it nonetheless seems worthwhile to consider whether it is possible 
to identify a theory of judicial power that would help inform the Court’s 
approach to executive views across this admittedly broad range of cases. 
The justifications for this approach are multiple.  First, the text of 
Article III setting forth the formal judicial power itself does not distin-
 
30 See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, The International State of Emergency:  Chal-
lenges to Constitutionalism after September 11 at 3-5 (Sept. 21, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (describing how national executives have used a se-
ries of U.N. Security Council antiterrorism resolutions to evade structural constitution-
al constraints domestically).  
31 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) (plurality opinion) (interpret-
ing the AUMF to authorize the detention of certain individuals as enemy combatants). 
32 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2100 (noting that the AUMF go-
verns a context in which the President “possesses independent constitutional authority 
under Article II,” so “the authorization need not be as precise as would be required in 
the absence of concurrent presidential authority”). 
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guish between statutes and treaties:  “The judicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . .”33  That is, the same 
judicial power appears to extend to any of the subject instruments.  It 
may be the case that formal power granted to the executive (in for-
eign relations but not elsewhere) has some effect on what deference 
the courts owe, and this Article will consider arguments supporting 
this possibility.  But because in the first instance the inquiry here is 
about the scope of the judicial power since Marbury, it seems necessary 
to begin by asking about the judicial power in general. 
Second, however unstable the category of “foreign relations law” 
may be, it is a field that both courts and scholars have long recognized 
as having some exceptional salience in informing how the Court 
should behave.  By embracing the full breadth of the category—
including its extension to both statutes and treaties—we might better 
understand how exceptional the category really is.  If foreign relations 
law is indeed increasingly indistinguishable from ordinary domestic 
law—either in its formal attributes (e.g., texts, history, and decisional 
law) or in the functional skills its application demands (e.g., expertise 
and political accountability)—that is all the more reason to ensure 
that any doctrine of “deference” in the field flows from some common 
understanding of the judicial role. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
Scholars have long posited that the courts defer to executive 
views in interpreting foreign relations law, particularly where matters 
of national security are concerned.34  In statutory interpretation, the 
Court has broadly construed legislative delegations of power to the 
President.35  Deference is all the more evident in treaty interpreta-
tion, it is argued, where the President’s record of prevailing in the 
Supreme Court is lengthy36 and where the President’s power to 
 
33 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
34 See sources cited supra note 4 for examples of scholarly opinion describing de-
ference to executive views.   
35 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936) 
(upholding a congressional delegation of authority to the President to impose an arms 
embargo under certain circumstances). 
36 See David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception:  Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1462-66 (1999) (arguing that judicial deference in treaty inter-
pretation increased during the twentieth century); Bradley, supra note 11, at 659 
(“Since early in the nation’s history, courts have been reluctant to contradict the ex-
ecutive branch in its conduct of foreign relations.”); Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty 
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“make treaties” may give the Court formal reasons to accede to the 
President’s interpretive wishes.37  Counternarratives exist, to be sure, 
but they have had seemingly modest effect in puncturing the prevail-
ing wisdom.38  Yet on descriptive and normative grounds, the Court’s 
behavior in the past decade especially has called the prevailing ac-
count into question.  This Part thus begins by highlighting some of 
the Court’s recent decisions that have posed the greatest challenge 
to historical expectations of deference in foreign relations law.  It 
then considers whether recent proposals to address the muddle of 
deference doctrine in foreign relations law succeed in remedying 
the problems their proponents hope to address. 
A.  Foreign Relations Deference in the Modern Court 
The notion that the Court defers regularly to the executive’s views 
in foreign relations law manifests itself somewhat differently in doc-
trines of treaty and statutory interpretation.  In treaty interpretation, 
the strongest argument that the Court defers to the executive’s read-
ing comes from a small number of twentieth-century cases in which 
the Court has noted that the “meaning given [treaties] by the de-
partments of government particularly charged with their negotiation 
and enforcement is given great weight.”39  To be clear, this “great 
 
Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (2008) (positing that twentieth-century courts 
regularly deferred to executive actions in foreign affairs). 
37 See sources cited supra note 36.  
38 Recent historical analysis of the founding-era Court finds no tradition of judicial 
deference to executive views on the meaning of treaties.  See David Sloss, Judicial Defe-
rence to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations:  A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 497, 502-22 (2007) (surveying the Supreme Court’s historically nondeferential 
approach to treaty interpretation).  In statutory interpretation, scholars have long 
worked to demonstrate that the political question doctrine, for example, has given the 
Supreme Court little pause in practice.  See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUES-
TIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 61 (1992) (arguing that the political question doctrine has 
played a minimal role in Supreme Court case law and “may be falling into desuetude”).  
39 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); see also Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. 
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) (“Although not conclusive, the meaning at-
tributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotia-
tion and enforcement is entitled to great weight.” (citing Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 194)); 
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933) (“[I]n resolving doubts the con-
struction of a treaty by the political department of the government, while not conclu-
sive upon courts called upon to construe it, is nevertheless of weight.”); Sullivan v. 
Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921) (“[T]he construction placed upon the treaty before us 
and consistently adhered to by the Executive Department of the Government, charged 
with the supervision of our foreign relations, should be given much weight.”); Charl-
ton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913) (“A construction of a treaty by the political de-
partment of the Government . . . is . . . of much weight.”). 
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weight” language is invariably qualified immediately before or after by 
insistence that the executive’s views are in no way “conclusive” on 
questions of interpretation.40  Indeed, most treaty cases that find the 
Court commenting at all about its interpretive methodology begin 
with familiar textualist statements to the effect that “[i]n construing a 
treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine 
its meaning.”41  A fair number of Supreme Court treaty cases say noth-
ing at all about notions of interpretive deference to the executive.42  
Nonetheless, Curtis Bradley, among others, has argued that such lan-
guage “is not mere window dressing, but rather is a significant factor 
in treaty interpretation.”43  And while raw outcome statistics tell us lit-
tle about the role of deference doctrine as a dispositive factor in Su-
preme Court treaty interpretation, the executive has succeeded in 
winning far more treaty interpretation cases than it has lost.44 
In statutory interpretation, strong notions of judicial deference to 
the executive in foreign relations matters are traced most commonly 
to United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., a non-wartime case in 
which the Court embraced the President’s reading of a statute dele-
gating authority to the executive to place an embargo on arms sales to 
certain countries.45  Rejecting a nondelegation challenge to the Presi-
dent’s exercise of authority, the Court wrote sweepingly of “the very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole or-
gan of the federal government in the field of international relations,”46 
a “vast external realm”47 in which “the President alone has the power 
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”48  Without making 
clear the full consequences of this description for statutory interpreta-
tion, Curtiss-Wright has been understood to suggest that standard ca-
nons of interpretation (in particular, construing the text against insti-
tuting overly broad delegations of power) are less salient in matters of 
 
40 See, e.g., Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184-85 (cautioning that agency interpretations are 
“not conclusive”). 
41 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992); see also Itel Contain-
ers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 65 (1993) (“Our interpretation must begin, 
as always, with the text of the Conventions.”). 
42 See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004); Nielsen v. Johnson, 
279 U.S. 47 (1929); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891). 
43 Bradley, supra note 11, at 701. 
44 See Chesney, supra note 12, at 1752-58 (reviewing treaty deference cases and 
concluding that the executive branch’s interpretation “prevails in most instances”). 
45 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 319. 
48 Id. 
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foreign relations.49  While Curtiss-Wright has been the subject of scath-
ing criticism over the years,50 it is broadly thought to contemplate ex-
ceedingly deferential attention to the President’s construction of sta-
tutory grants of authority.51 
Whether or not deference doctrines in treaty and statutory inter-
pretation have ever had much stability or influence,52 they have been 
little in evidence in the Court’s interpretive methodology in recent 
years.  This Section highlights some of the more important opinions 
in this regard, concluding that the Court has shown no inclination to 
pretermit its own interpretive inquiry so that it might defer to an in-
terpretation advanced by the executive.  On the contrary, these cases 
are most readily understood to embrace the vigorous assertion of the 
Court’s own formal power of interpretation, including the wide-
ranging consideration of functional arguments advanced by all sides. 
 
49 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2100-01 (“‘[T]he same limitations on 
delegation do not apply where the entity exercising the delegated authority itself pos-
sesses independent authority over the subject matter.’” (quoting Loving v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 748, 772 (1996))).  
50 See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation:  
An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 28-32 (1973) (criticizing the decision and its 
resulting impact).  
51 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Su-
preme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1083, 1098-1100 (2008) (describing a continuum of judicial deference regimes, 
along which Curtiss-Wright-type attention to executive views appears at the most defe-
rential end); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2101-02 (citing Curtiss-
Wright in support of broad readings of congressional delegations of power to the ex-
ecutive in foreign affairs). 
52 Eskridge and Baer’s survey of 1014 Supreme Court cases since Chevron in which 
an agency interpretation of a statute was at issue classifies only nine of these as foreign 
affairs and national security matters receiving “super-strong deference”—cases in 
which “the executive department interpretation prevails not only” when the statute is 
ambiguous, “but also in cases where Congress has not clearly trumped the agency or 
presidential construction.”  Eskridge & Baer, supra note 51, at 1101-02 & n.56.  But 
even in these nine cases, it is debatable whether the executive’s position prevailed be-
cause the Court deferred to an executive interpretation of a statute rather than reach-
ing that result based on its own independent analysis.  For example, one of the nine 
cases, Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005), announced no 
deference scheme and conducted a thorough de novo exercise in statutory interpreta-
tion, noting only at the end that a “policy of deference” to the executive in foreign af-
fairs would also lead it to favor the interpretation already given.  Id. at 348.  Another of 
the nine, Cheney v. United States District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), involved the inter-
pretation of the common law writ of mandamus and common law executive privilege. 
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1.  Interpreting Treaties 
Perhaps the most instructive set of cases from the modern Court 
illuminating treaty interpretation has been the series addressing the 
domestic effect of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations,53 which requires authorities to inform a noncitizen arrestee 
of her right to notify her home consulate of an arrest or pending 
prosecution in U.S. courts.54  In Breard v. Greene, the Court held that 
state procedural rules requiring defendants to raise treaty claims at 
trial or waive those claims on appeal could prevent a defendant from 
having the claim heard at all in a subsequent federal habeas proceed-
ing.55  But soon after the Breard decision came down, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ)—which an optional protocol to the Convention 
named as having “compulsory jurisdiction” over “[d]ispute[s] arising 
out of the interpretation or application of the Convention”56—ruled 
to the contrary.  According to the ICJ, the application of a state pro-
cedural default rule to block habeas consideration of a defendant’s 
treaty claim violated Article 36 of the Convention because it “had the 
effect of preventing ‘full effect [from being] given to the purposes for 
which the rights accorded under this article are intended.’”57 
The Supreme Court took up the effect of the ICJ ruling in two 
subsequent opinions—both of which seem most distinguished for 
their vigorous defense of the power of the Court itself.  Sanchez-Llamas 
v. Oregon involved the failure of the Virginia state police to notify Mr. 
Sanchez-Llamas of his right to consular notification following his ar-
 
53 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
54 See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-06 (2008) (holding that Vienna Con-
vention provisions are non-self-executing); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 358-
60 (2006) (rejecting a claim that a judgment of the International Court of Justice re-
quires overriding application of state procedural default rules); Breard v. Greene, 523 
U.S. 371, 375-77 (1998) (determining that the Vienna Convention did not preclude ap-
plication of state procedural default rules).  The Vienna Convention provides that when 
the police of a signatory nation arrest a foreign national, the detaining “authorities shall 
inform” the foreign national “without delay” of his “right[]” to contact his nation’s consu-
lar officers.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 53, art. 36. 
55 Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-76 (holding that state procedural rules can trump a de-
fendant’s collateral assertion of Vienna Convention rights). 
56 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 1, done 
Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 488 (ratified by the United States in 1969). 
57 LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 498 (June 27) (quoting Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 53, art. 36(2)); see also Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 43 (Mar. 31) (finding a duty to give a 
detainee notice of Article 36 rights once there is a strong reason to believe the person 
is a foreign national).  
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rest.58  In rejecting Sanchez-Llamas’s argument that suppression of 
evidence was a proper remedy for an Article 36 violation, the Court 
made no mention of a canon of interpretive deference.59  On the con-
trary, to the extent the Court discussed its interpretive approach, it 
was with simple reference to the Restatement version of treaty construc-
tion:  “An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”60  Likewise re-
jecting the suggestion that the Court must accept the ICJ’s decision as 
authoritative on the treaty,61 the Court emphasized that it could not be 
bound by the judgment of another judicial body.62  The Court’s rea-
soning on this point did not begin with any discussion of deference 
(to the executive’s views or those of anyone else), but instead with a 
ringing endorsement of the power of the independent judiciary:  “If 
treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal system, de-
termining their meaning as a matter of federal law ‘is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department,’ headed by the ‘one su-
preme Court’ established by the Constitution.”63  Only after conclud-
ing, based on its own reading of the ICJ’s enabling statute, that 
“[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its in-
terpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts,” did the 
Court note in its final paragraph that the interpretations of “‘the de-
partments of government particularly charged with [treaties’] negotia-
tion and enforcement is given great weight.’”64  As it turned out, the 
Court said, the executive agreed with its judgment that ICJ rulings are 
not binding on U.S. courts.65 
 
58 548 U.S. at 340.  
59 See id. at 345-50. 
60 Id. at 346 (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) (1987)).   
61 Id. at 353.  Because the Court ruled against habeas petitioners on the remedy 
question, it concluded it did not need to reach the third question presented in the 
case:  “whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grants rights that may be invoked 
by individuals in a judicial proceeding.” Id. at 342-43. 
62 Id. at 353-55. 
63 Id. at 353-54 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)) 
(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378-79 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“At the 
core of [the judicial] power is the federal courts’ independent responsibility—
independent from its coequal branches in the Federal Government, and independent 
from the separate authority of the several States—to interpret federal law.”)). 
64 Id. at 354-55 (quoting Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)).  
65 Id. at 355. 
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Yet even this passing notice of deference to the executive ultimate-
ly rang hollow.  In 2005, the year before Sanchez-Llamas, President 
Bush issued a memorandum opinion stating that the United States 
would discharge its international obligations under the ICJ judgment by 
“having State courts give effect to the [ICJ] decision in accordance with 
general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals 
addressed in that decision.”66  If the Sanchez-Llamas Court had been 
principally interested in giving effect to the President’s desired outcome 
in these cases, one might imagine it would have been at least possible to 
construe the relevant texts to require that state courts give the decision 
such an effect.  Instead, the Court went to great lengths to restate the 
executive’s more nuanced position on the Court’s own terms.  While 
the executive had “agreed to ‘discharge its international obligations’ in 
having state courts give effect to the [ICJ’s] decision,” it did not express-
ly take the position that the ICJ’s interpretation binds U.S. courts.67 
In this light, the Court’s more recent decision in Medellín v. Texas68 
was of a piece with its equivocal response to the executive’s views.  
Asked to determine whether the ICJ’s judgment itself gave petitioners 
an enforceable right, the Court began with the same familiar, non-
deferential statement of treaty interpretation.69  While the Court 
agreed with the executive that the relevant treaties did not render ICJ 
decisions directly enforceable in U.S. courts, it was only after the 
Court thoroughly considered and rejected Medellín’s argument that it 
mentioned that “the United States’ interpretation of a treaty ‘is en-
titled to great weight.’”70  Of greater significance, in rejecting the no-
tion that the President’s 2005 memorandum telling state courts to 
give effect to the ICJ decision required those courts to comply, the 
Court dismissed the executive’s argument that the ICJ judgment “be-
came the law of the land [binding on courts] pursuant to the Presi-
 
66 Memorandum from President George W. Bush for the Attorney General (Feb. 
28, 2005), reprinted in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents app. at 9a, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2004) (No. 04-5928). 
67 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 355 (quoting Memorandum from President George 
W. Bush, supra note 66). 
68 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
69 See id. at 506-07 (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a sta-
tute, begins with its text.  Because a treaty ratified by the United States is ‘an agree-
ment among sovereign powers,’ we have also considered as ‘aids to its interpretation’ 
the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification under-
standing’ of signatory nations.” (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 
217, 226 (1996) (citation omitted))).  
70 Id. at 513 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 
(1982)). 
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dent’s Memorandum and his power ‘to establish binding rules of deci-
sion that preempt contrary state law.’”71  Central to the executive’s po-
sition on this point was that the relevant treaties should be read to 
“‘implicitly give the President’” the power to implement the United 
States’ “treaty-based obligation” to effect compliance with the ICJ’s 
decision.72  In essence, the executive was asking the Court to accept its 
interpretation of the treaty—a reading that would allow it to maintain 
that the treaty could not be enforced by courts upon the request of an 
individual asserting a right, but could be (indeed must be) enforced 
when the executive issued an informal instruction for court-based 
compliance.  This the Court refused to do, insisting that only Con-
gress could convert “a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing 
one.”73  If the executive wanted to achieve this effect, it could have en-
sured that the treaty “contain[ed] language plainly providing for do-
mestic enforceability.”74  As the Court had just concluded that the 
treaty could not be read that way—as one might have thought a more 
deferential analysis would require—the executive could not prevail. 
The foregoing is hardly meant to argue that the executive’s un-
derstanding of treaties is irrelevant to judicial interpretation.  On the 
contrary, the Court clearly counts among its interpretive tools posi-
tions the executive has taken in negotiating treaties and in imple-
menting them.75  But drawing on executive views as probative of “legis-
lative” intent (because it is reflective of the negotiating history) or as 
evidence of post-ratification performance is notably different from at-
tending to the executive’s views because of some functional interest in 
the executive’s superior political accountability or expertise, as Che-
vron contemplates.76  Because they reflect executive behavior and not a 
particular executive’s particular interpretive views, a treaty’s negotiat-
ing history and post-ratification practice may or may not turn out to 
support the position of any given executive in any given case.  In trea-
ties, as in contracts, performance has been understood to be evidence 
 
71 Id. at 523 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, supra note 5, at 5).  
72 Id. at 525 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, supra note 5, at 11). 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 526. 
75 See supra note 39 (citing cases in which the Court considered executive negotiat-
ing history and performance). 
76 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 
(1984) (supporting the practice of judicial deference to executive agencies on grounds 
of the executive’s electoral accountability and expertise).  
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of the parties’ intent in creating the agreement; postcontract perfor-
mance can inform the meaning of an ambiguous clause.77  It is thus 
the behavior of both parties to a treaty that the Court has found prob-
ative as a matter of interpretation.78  To the extent the Court attends 
to the executive’s views, it regularly looks to the views of both negotiat-
ing partners as evidence of negotiating intent and of post-ratification 
performance.79  As a unanimous Court put it: 
Our role is limited to giving effect to the intent of theTreaty [sic] parties.  
When the parties to a treaty both agree as to the meaning of a treaty 
provision, and that interpretation follows from the clear treaty language, 
we must, absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence, defer to that 
interpretation.
80
 
In this context, the Court’s lack of deference to the U.S. executive 
since September 11, 2001, on the interpretation of the international 
law of armed conflict (including the Geneva Conventions) should 
perhaps have been less surprising than it seemed.  Consider Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld,81 which presented the Court with a challenge to the legali-
ty of military-commission trials then underway at Guantanamo Bay.  
Among other claims, Hamdan argued that the commission regime ran 
afoul of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, treaties re-
quiring, inter alia, that trials be held in a “‘regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable by civilized peoples.’”82  The Court promptly rejected the ex-
 
77 See Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921) (stating that treaties should be in-
terpreted in part by reference to principles of contract interpretation). 
78 See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1961) (“We have before us state-
ments, in the form of diplomatic notes exchanged between the responsible agencies of 
the United States and of Yugoslavia, to the effect that the 1881 Treaty, now and always, 
has been construed as providing for inheritance by both countries’ nationals without 
regard to the location of the property to be passed or the domiciles of the nationals.”). 
79 Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), is especially direct in 
this regard.  There, the Court reviewed evidence of both U.S. and Japanese intent to de-
cide whether female employees’ Title VII discrimination claim against an American sub-
sidiary of a Japanese company was effectively precluded by the terms of the Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation Treaty between the United States and Japan.  See id. at 185-89. 
80 Id. at 185 (emphasis added).  Indeed, it was on this basis that Justice Scalia dis-
sented in a later treaty interpretation case, arguing not that insufficient deference was 
paid to the United States’ position but that “[w]hen we interpret a treaty, we accord 
the judgments of our sister signatories ‘considerable weight.’”  Olympic Airways v. Hu-
sain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Air 
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985)).  
81 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
82 Id. at 630 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War art. 3, came into force Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135). 
PEARLSTEIN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011  11:53 AM 
2011] After Deference 801 
ecutive’s initial argument—that the Court should abstain from decid-
ing the issues in the case at all.83  Rather, in light of “‘the duty which 
rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to pre-
serve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty,’” the 
Court explained, “‘the public interest require[s] that we consider and 
decide those questions without any avoidable delay.’”84  The Court was 
even more direct in rejecting the executive’s claim that it should pre-
vail on the merits of its argument that Geneva had no application to 
Hamdan’s case.85  With no mention of deference and calling the gov-
ernment’s treaty interpretation simply “erroneous,” the Court held 
that Common Article 3 applied to the armed conflict at issue.86  While 
the Court recognized that the treaty was ambiguous in some respects, 
it did not hesitate in concluding that the executive’s commissions did 
not satisfy what requirements there were.87 
2.  Interpreting Statutes 
To the extent the Court’s post–September 11 statutory cases have 
addressed the question of interpretive deference at all, they likewise 
show little indication that the Court believes extraordinary deference is 
due in foreign relations law—and, indeed, often appear to apply a less 
deferential standard than the Court uses when construing statutory 
grants of authority to executive agencies in administrative law.  Consid-
 
83 See id. at 584-85 (addressing the Government’s argument that the Court should 
apply the “judge-made rule that civilian courts should await the final outcome of on-
going military proceedings before entertaining an attack on those proceedings” (quot-
ing Brief for Respondents at 12, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-
0184))); see also id. at 587-88 (finding that the commission review system “clearly 
lack[s] the structural insulation from military influence that characterizes the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces, and thus bear[s] insufficient conceptual similarity to 
state courts to warrant invocation of abstention principles”).  
84 Id. at 588 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942)); see also id. at 589 
(concluding that despite the executive’s claims of military necessity, “the Government 
has identified no other ‘important countervailing interest’ that would permit federal 
courts to depart from their general ‘duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred 
upon them by Congress’” (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
85 See id. at 625-35 (describing the executive’s argument).  
86 Id. at 630-32. 
87 See id. at 635 (“Common Article 3 obviously tolerates a great degree of flexibility 
in trying individuals captured during armed conflict; its requirements are general 
ones, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems.  But requirements they are 
nonetheless.  The commission that the President has convened to try Hamdan does 
not meet those requirements.”).  
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er Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,88 in which the Court was called to determine 
whether the President’s detention of a U.S. citizen, whom the govern-
ment alleged the U.S. military seized during operations in Afghanistan, 
was authorized by the 2001 AUMF.89  In defending its authority to de-
tain Yaser Hamdi as an “enemy combatant,” the executive insisted that 
the question whether “captured enemy combatants are entitled to POW 
privileges under the [Third Geneva Convention] is a quintessential 
matter that the Constitution (not to mention the [Convention]) leaves 
to the political branches and, in particular, the President.”90 
While recognizing that the AUMF afforded the executive at least 
some statutory authority to detain Hamdi,91 the plurality opinion reads 
as a vigorous endorsement of independent judicial review.  As Justice 
O’Connor explained, the AUMF must be read to authorize Hamdi’s 
detention not because an alternative reading would infringe the Pres-
ident’s constitutional power or other separation-of-powers interests, 
but because, by the Justices’ own reading of “longstanding law-of-war 
principles”92 and international “‘agreement and practice,’”93 detention 
“to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental 
incident of waging war.”94  If in the Court’s judgment, “the practical cir-
cumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts 
that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding 
 
88 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  
89 See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006) (authorizing the President to “use all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks).  
90 Brief for Respondents at 24 n.9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-
6696).  To be clear, the executive’s claim was not that the Court should defer to a partic-
ular determination by the President of a particular detainee’s eligibility for POW status 
on the facts.  Rather, this was a generalized conclusion about the relevance of the Con-
vention to a conflict between two state parties to the treaty (the United States and Afgha-
nistan).  See id. at 12 (“[T]he nature of judicial review available with respect to the mili-
tary’s enemy-combatant determination is limited by the profound separation-of-powers 
concerns implicated by efforts to second-guess the factual basis for the exercise of the 
Commander in Chief’s authority to detain a captured enemy combatant in wartime.”).   
91 The plurality made it clear that it was limiting its reading of the AUMF detention 
authority to the particular facts of Hamdi’s case.  See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (plurality 
opinion) (adopting, “for purposes of this case,” the government’s definition of an 
“enemy combatant” as one who was “‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United 
States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict 
against the United States’ there” (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra note 90, at 3)). 
92 Id. at 521. 
93 Id. at 518 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942)). 
94 Id. at 519. 
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may unravel.”95  Indeed, as Justice O’Connor then noted in rejecting 
the executive’s view that the process provided to Hamdi was sufficient: 
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments 
of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a 
war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it 
does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exer-
cise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of re-
viewing and resolving claims like those presented here.
96
 
Notably, whatever deference may be due—and it appeared not to be 
much—it was due not to the President in particular or the executive 
writ large, but to “the judgments of military authorities” who are func-
tionally expert on the issue. 
Hamdi’s companion case, Rasul v. Bush,97 tested the Court’s author-
ity more directly.  The executive had argued that the federal courts 
lacked jurisdiction to consider petitions that noncitizen detainees held 
at Guantanamo Bay brought under the federal habeas statute.98  Yet in 
rejecting the government’s jurisdictional argument, the Court was not 
deterred by the notion that it should defer to the executive’s interpre-
tation of the habeas statute.  According to the Court, the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of federal statutes that the executive 
invoked had no relevance where U.S. territory was at issue—and the 
military base at Guantanamo was, effectively, just such a place.99 
 
95 Id. at 521. 
96 Id. at 535 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-34 (1944) (Mur-
phy, J., dissenting) (“[L]ike other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional 
rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of 
having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests recon-
ciled.”); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932) (“What are the allowable lim-
its of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particu-
lar case, are judicial questions.”)). 
97 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
98 See id. at 475 (“Respondents’ primary submission is that the answer to the jurisdic-
tional question is controlled by . . . Eisentrager.”); see also Brief for Respondents at 14-25, 
Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-0334, 03-0343) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763 (1950), as controlling precedent).  Among other arguments, the government con-
tended that the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes “‘has special 
force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and 
military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.’”  Id. at 19 (quoting Sale 
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).   
99 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (“From a practical perspective, the indefinite lease of 
Guantanamo Bay has produced a place that belongs to the United States, extending 
the ‘implied protection’ of the United States to it.” (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 
777-78)).  Because “sovereignty” per se was not the touchstone of jurisdictional author-
ity, the executive’s interpretation of the U.S.-Cuba lease agreement (allowing Cuba to 
retain “ultimate sovereignty”) in this regard was similarly irrelevant. 
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In any event, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld100 soon dispelled whatever ex-
pectation of unquestioned deference on issues of statutory interpreta-
tion remained.  In addition to its treaty arguments, the executive ar-
gued that the AUMF and the statutory Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ)101 should be read to extend executive authority to try 
Hamdan in a military commission.  The use of military commissions 
was a “necessary” part of the “necessary and appropriate force” the 
AUMF authorized the President to use, and “courts are not competent 
to second-guess judgments of the political branches regarding the ex-
tent of force necessary to prosecute a war.”102  In addition, the gov-
ernment argued that Article 36 of the UCMJ squarely “authorize[d] 
the President to establish procedures ‘for cases arising under this 
chapter triable in . . . military commissions.’”103  Under that provision, 
the President was delegated broad authority to establish the rules for 
commission proceedings, including rules different from those gener-
ally recognized in criminal cases, whenever the President “considers” 
application of those rules to be not “practicable.”104  Deference was 
due the President’s judgment on what counts as “practicable” by the 
terms of the statute itself.  Here, the President had already made such 
a dispositive finding in his executive order, which provided that “the 
danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of interna-
tional terrorism” made standard criminal trials impracticable.105 
On its face, the executive’s argument that it was entitled to some 
measure of deference in interpreting the AUMF and UCMJ seems 
squarely within the Curtiss-Wright tradition of interpreting delegations 
of power broadly.  Alternatively, the executive might have been ac-
corded Chevron deference, with the President in the role of an expert 
agency—and therefore one whose interpretation should prevail as 
long as it is reasonable.106  Yet in an opinion that mentioned neither 
 
100 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
101 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006). 
102 Brief for Respondents at 19, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 
05-0184).   
103 Id. at 18 (quoting Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006)). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 47 n.22 (quoting Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001:  Detention, Treatment, 
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2009)).  
106 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 
(1984) (holding that when a statute’s meaning is ambiguous, the Court will defer to the 
agency’s judgment as long as it is reasonable); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (clarifying the scope of Chevron deference to require a delegation 
by Congress of authority to make regulations “with the force of law.”). 
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Curtiss-Wright nor Chevron, the Court rejected the government’s argu-
ments in a technical, purely de novo analysis of the relevant UCMJ 
provisions.  In the Court’s view, the President’s generalized finding 
about the viability of criminal trials was “insufficient.”107  Statutory lan-
guage requiring commission and court martial procedures to be “uni-
form” to the extent “practicable”108 did not say that uniformity could 
be waived whenever the President “consider[ed]” it impracticable.109  
This statutory standard required uniformity “insofar as practicable”110—a 
seemingly more objective test.  And even if it were possible to satisfy the 
requirement without an “official determination,” the Court deemed the 
impracticability requirement “not satisfied here.”111  Why?  “Nothing in 
the record before us demonstrates that it would be impracticable to ap-
ply court-martial rules in this case.”112  Even assuming that the Presi-
dent’s generalized finding that criminal trials were inadequate was rele-
vant to the impracticability inquiry, and even assuming that such a 
finding “would be entitled to a measure of deference”113 under the sta-
tute, “the only reason offered in support of that determination is the 
danger posed by international terrorism.”114  While the Court empha-
sized that it did not “for one moment underestimat[e] that danger,” it 
found no specific reason in the record for challenging the notion that 
standard court-martial rules would work.115 
The Court’s most recent cases involving the availability of statutory 
remedies for military detainees did not substantially alter the notably 
nondeferential Hamdan landscape in this regard.  Boumediene v. Bush 
struck down a key provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(MCA)—one attempting to strip the courts of jurisdiction to hear the 
habeas petitions of Guantanamo detainees—as an unconstitutional 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.116  Rejecting the executive’s 
proposed construction of the statute that might have rendered alter-
native statutory procedures a constitutionally adequate substitute for 
habeas, the Court found the MCA constitutionally deficient despite 
the availability of both the canon of constitutional avoidance (which 
 
107 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622. 
108 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2006). 
109 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622. 
110 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (emphasis added). 
111 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 623. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 623 n.51. 
114 Id. at 623. 
115 Id. at 624. 
116 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787-92 (2008).  
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the Court mentioned explicitly) and the possibility of judicial defe-
rence to executive interpretation that might have facilitated a decision 
finding a constitutionally permissible construction of the MCA.117  
While dicta in the Court’s opinion indicated some deference to the 
judgment of the political branches that Hamdi, Rasul, and Hamdan 
had entirely ignored, that passing language seemed to do little work 
in the Court’s analysis, and it did not affect the outcome of the case.118 
Munaf v. Geren,119 in contrast, does appear to rely on the notion of 
deference to the political branches.  There, the Court rejected on the 
merits habeas petitions filed by U.S. citizens held by U.S.-led multina-
tional forces in Iraq.  Petitioners had asked the Court to enjoin their 
transfer to Iraqi authorities for prosecution, arguing that transfer 
would violate U.S. treaty and statutory obligations not to send individ-
uals to another country where they were likely to face torture.120  While 
 
117 See id. at 789 (concluding there was “no way to construe the statute to allow 
what is also constitutionally required in this context:  an opportunity for the detainee 
to present relevant exculpatory evidence that was not made part of the record in the 
earlier proceedings”); see also id. at 792 (“To hold that the detainees at Guantanamo 
may, under the DTA, challenge the President’s legal authority to detain them, contest 
the CSRT’s findings of fact, supplement the record on review with exculpatory evi-
dence, and request an order of release would come close to reinstating the § 2241 ha-
beas corpus process Congress sought to deny them.  The language of the statute, read 
in light of Congress’s reasons for enacting it, cannot bear this interpretation.”).   
118 See id. at 796 (“In considering both the procedural and substantive standards 
used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be ac-
corded to the political branches.”).  Yet, from his mention of deference, Justice Ken-
nedy drew at most a conclusion of policy, not one of interpretation:  “The law must 
accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain those who pose a 
real danger to our security.”  Id. at 797.  Beyond that, the opinion is notably obscure 
on how deference is to be accorded and to whom.  One most easily reads Justice Ken-
nedy as understanding the deference obligation to go to Congress and the President—
not to the executive alone.  Indeed, far from embracing traditional deference-like jus-
tifications, such as the danger that court involvement would risk embarrassment of 
multifarious pronouncements from different branches, Justice Kennedy insisted that 
the exercise of executive authority is “vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by” 
courts.  Id.  Moreover, Justice Scalia categorically rejected the notion that the Court’s 
posture was deferential in any regard.  On the contrary, Scalia found Justice Kennedy’s 
approach “a pose of faux deference to Congress and the President. . . . What the Court 
apparently means is that the political branches can debate, after which the Third 
Branch will decide.”  Id. at 830 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
119 553 U.S. 674 (2008).  
120 Id. at 703 n.6 (citing the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-822, and the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, registered 
June 26, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“No State Party shall 
expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”)).  
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again rejecting the executive’s contention that the habeas statute did 
not authorize federal court jurisdiction in the case, the Court con-
cluded rather broadly that “in the present context [the risk of torture] 
is to be addressed by the political branches, not the judiciary.”121  Here, 
the State Department had determined that the Iraqi prisons have 
“‘generally met internationally accepted standards for basic prisoner 
needs,’”122 and according to the Solicitor General, “the United States 
would object to [the multinational forces’] transfer of [petitioner] to 
Iraqi custody if it thought that he would likely be tortured.”123  The per 
curiam opinion embraced the executive’s position, noting that the 
Court was “not suited to second-guess” the government’s judgment of 
“whether there is a serious prospect of torture at the hands of an ally.”124 
Although the Court’s attitude toward the executive here feels dif-
ferent, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Court’s broad lan-
guage has any bearing on its view of the significance of executive sta-
tutory (or treaty) interpretation.  Importantly, the Court declined to 
reach the full merits of the detainees’ statutory claims on the ground 
that they had not successfully raised them in the courts below.  Simi-
larly, the deference the Court appears to be exercising is not to an in-
terpretation by the executive of its own legal authority, but rather to 
its assessment of the relevant facts—namely, whether the detainees 
were likely to face torture at the hands of the Iraqis.  Deference to an 
executive’s finding of facts carries far less significance for our under-
standing of judicial power than does deference on questions of law.  
Appeals courts defer to superior factfinders with regularity—whether 
juries, trial courts, or administrative judges—with no special signific-
ance for the scope of Article III power.  With Munaf most easily read 
to embrace this brand of deference, it has fewer implications for the 
power of the courts “to say what the law is.”125 
B.  The Elusive Promise of Chevron 
In the wake of such decisions, it is not surprising that scholars 
have turned renewed attention to the task of identifying a doctrine of 
“deference” in foreign relations law.  Whether driven by the norma-
 
121 Id. at 700. 
122 Reply Brief for the Federal Parties at 23, Munaf, 553 U.S. 674 (Nos. 07-0394 and 
06-1666) (quoting Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, Iraq, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE (Mar. 11, 2008), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100596.htm). 
123 Id. at 23. 
124 Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702. 
125 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).  
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tive concern that the Court was no longer taking sufficient account of 
the executive’s superior expertise and political responsiveness,126 or 
by the rule-of-law interest in providing some interpretive guidance to 
the Court,127 the particular challenge of balancing the executive’s in-
terpretive power against the Court’s has reemerged as a vexing prob-
lem.  While rejecting the notion that the executive’s “primacy in the 
interpretation of international law” gives him the power to ignore 
treaty requirements that are otherwise clear, scholars such as Sun-
stein and Posner have argued that courts should defer to executive 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes and treaties in this realm in 
much the same way deference has been given to executive agency in-
terpretations since the Court’s watershed opinion in Chevron.128  Che-
vron famously established a two-step inquiry that courts were to follow 
in ascertaining how to account for executive views when reviewing 
agency interpretations of statutory authority.  Where the Court finds 
statutory meaning clear in the first instance, no further interpretive 
inquiry is necessary.129  But where the meaning of the statute is ambi-
guous, the Court ceases its usual exercise in determining the law’s 
import and inquires only whether the executive agency’s interpreta-
tion is a “permissible construction of the statute.”130  If it is, no further 
judicial inquiry into the meaning of the law is necessary.  So too, 
Sunstein and Posner have suggested that, in foreign relations law, the 
executive’s interpretation of ambiguous laws should prevail as long as 
its interpretation is reasonable.131 
In this view, Chevron is thought to carry several advantages over a 
more generalized assumption of judicial deference to the President 
in the foreign relations setting.  Chevron is “well-entrenched in the 
Supreme Court, with all of the nine current justices [at the time of 
 
126 See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1176 (arguing that courts should de-
fer to the executive’s foreign policy expertise); Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 
supra note 11, at 2671 (arguing for a generous interpretation of presidential powers). 
127 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2084 (proposing to provide “a 
more systematic account” of the factors “relevant to interpreting the AUMF”); Ches-
ney, supra note 12, at 1727 (lamenting that “the deference doctrine appears more un-
settled and indeterminate than ever before”); Sullivan, supra note 36, at 781 (noting 
that courts have “failed to provide any clarity in [the] doctrine” for determining what 
degree of deference is appropriate).  
128 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1221-22.  
129 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
130 Id. at 843.   
131 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1222. 
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Bradley’s writing] accepting its basic framework.”132  It thus promises 
a more regularized approach to judicial engagement with executive 
law interpretation and could help not only cabin judicial discretion, 
but also clarify the rules of interpretation for Congress, agencies, 
and lower courts.133  Moreover, Chevron could serve an important set 
of functional goals: 
[Chevron] pushes “interpretive lawmaking” to government entities that 
have more expertise and democratic accountability than courts.  In addi-
tion, by centralizing this lawmaking in the executive branch rather than 
in a diffuse court system, the Chevron doctrine is designed to promote 
uniformity in the law.  And by allowing for changes in interpretation, it 
seeks to promote flexibility in regulatory governance.
134
 
It is argued that, if anything, the doctrine’s functional rationale—
grounded in the executive’s superior political accountability and ex-
pertise—-is even stronger in foreign relations than in traditional ad-
ministrative law.  Because the executive bears the primary political 
burden of failures in foreign relations, the executive attends to those 
relationships closely and is best positioned both to assess present facts 
and to predict what future consequences legal interpretations will 
have.135  Chevron thus offers a useful middle ground between the near-
total deference courts were thought to have shown in foreign relations 
law, and a Marbury-based insistence that the Court’s approach to statu-
tory and treaty interpretation should be fundamentally independent 
of executive views. 
In exploring methods of guiding judicial engagement with execu-
tive views, there can be little doubt that the Court’s recent foreign rela-
tions cases challenge traditional accounts of judicial deference.  Yet the 
perceived strengths of Chevron in particular—in doctrinal clarity and at-
tention to functional concerns—may be more elusive than its advocates 
suggest.  Chevron’s doctrinal stability is in fact increasingly precarious, 
and its flexibility in taking functional interests into account is in key re-
spects quite limited.  More than that, Chevron carried with it, and still 
carries, substantial questions about how it may be applied while main-
 
132 Bradley, supra note 11, at 673.  Note, however, that since Bradley’s article was 
published in 2000, several new Justices have been confirmed to the Court.  
133 See id. at 668, 773-75 (discussing disadvantages of a multifactor approach and 
advantages of Chevron).  But see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive 
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992) (arguing that the Court continued to rely on 
multifactor tests despite Chevron).   
134 Bradley, supra note 11, at 673 (footnotes omitted). 
135 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1206-07 (noting that the executive is far 
more politically accountable than the courts in the face of foreign policy crises). 
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taining the integrity of the formal judicial power.  In the years after Che-
vron came down, many scholars saw the decision as a sign that the Court 
was prepared to abdicate a significant portion of the judicial power 
identified in Marbury “to say what the law is.”136  It was one thing for a 
court to take executive factfinding and expert analysis into account in 
understanding the scope of Congress’s delegation.  It was another thing 
for the Court to pretermit its own interpretive inquiry because the ex-
ecutive had a greater claim to democratic legitimacy across the board.  
If the executive’s political bona fides matter in interpreting laws dele-
gating power to an agency, why not cede interpretive power to the ex-
ecutive altogether?  While scholars have developed a set of theories at-
tempting to explain how the judicial power may be shared in this 
regard, as shall be discussed below, the formal dilemma very much pers-
ists.  For these reasons, as this Section details, Chevron seems a less than 
ideal candidate for resolving how the courts and the executive should 
share interpretive power in the law of foreign relations. 
1.  The Chevron that Survives 
It is perhaps more than a little ironic that Chevron has gained in-
terest from foreign relations scholars at the same time that scholars of 
administrative law have been demonstrating with increasing persua-
siveness how limited the impact of Chevron has been in cases reviewing 
agency statutory interpretation.  One of the most comprehensive em-
pirical studies available finds that, from the time Chevron was decided 
in 1984 through the Court’s 2005 Term, Chevron “was applied in only 
8.3% of Supreme Court cases evaluating agency statutory interpreta-
tions.”137  Indeed, to the extent it is possible to tell a unified, qualita-
tive story about the trajectory of the Court’s major administrative law 
cases since 1984, it is mostly a story that sees the Court narrowing the 
range of agency decisions to which Chevron might apply and insisting 
upon the significant interpretive power the Court retains even within 
the Chevron regime.  More, it shows a Court chafing against the some-
 
136 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also, e.g., Stephen 
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) 
(describing the assumption that Congress delegates lawmaking power to the executive 
agency as a “legal fiction”); Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 11, at 2589 (describ-
ing Chevron as “a kind of counter-Marbury for the administrative state”).  
137 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 51, at 1090.  In the vast majority of the 1014 cases 
the Court decided during this period in which an executive agency interpretation of a 
statute was at issue, the Court applied either less stringent deference than that af-
forded by Chevron, or no apparent deference at all.  Id. at 1121.   
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times awkward limits Chevron seems to impose on why executive views 
might matter and when they may be taken into interpretive account. 
The story of Chevron’s less-than-transformative impact is not incon-
sistent with the doctrine’s origin and history.  By the time Chevron 
came down in 1984, the Court had been grappling for decades with 
how to treat executive agency interpretations of federal statutes.138  In 
this effort, the Court had long recognized—as it reiterated in Che-
vron—that executive agency views could help give a “‘full understand-
ing of the force of the statutory policy’” when a given situation “‘de-
pend[s] upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters 
subjected to agency regulations.’”139  Nonetheless, as Chevron itself in-
sisted, “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory con-
struction and must reject administrative constructions which are con-
trary to clear congressional intent.”140  Judges were to retain significant 
independent authority to determine whether a statute is clear or am-
biguous—often the end of an interpretive inquiry—and to determine 
whether an agency’s interpretation is “reasonable,” also a seemingly 
broad retention of power.141 
Nonetheless, Chevron was broadly seen as revolutionary in identify-
ing the executive’s superior political accountability—and the Court’s 
correspondingly limited credentials in that realm—and in citing that 
functional strength as a central basis for deferring to an agency inter-
pretation of a statute.142  As the Court famously explained:  “While 
 
138 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to adminis-
ter.”); see also Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1170-71 (2009) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (“Judicial deference to agencies’ views on statutes 
they administer was not born in Chevron . . . , nor did the ‘singularly judicial role of 
marking the boundaries of agency choice’ die with that case.” (quoting Young v. Cmty. 
Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting))).    
139 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 
(1961)); see also id. at 865 (“Judges are not experts in the field . . . .”). 
140 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
141 See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State:  A Struc-
tural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1239, 1243-44 (2002) (detailing the power over interpretation the Court retained 
even under Chevron). 
142 See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 51, at 1086-87 (“Almost immediately, Rea-
gan Administration officials and appointees proclaimed a ‘Chevron Revolution.’”); 
Merrill, supra note 133, at 976 (“Justice Stevens’[s] opinion contained several features 
that can only be described as ‘revolutionary,’ even if no revolution was intended at the 
time.” (quoting Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON 
REG. 283, 284 (1986))); see also Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 11, at 2596 (de-
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agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Execu-
tive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices” in interpreting ambiguous 
statutes.143  Accordingly, “federal judges—who have no constituency—
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who 
do.”144  Statutory interpretation was, at least at the ambiguous margins, 
a task that demanded policy judgments of various sorts—judgments 
best carried out by one or the other political branch.  It would thus be 
assumed that an ambiguous statute was Congress’s implicit attempt to 
leave some interpretive power with the executive agency. 
Yet the Chevron-revolution understanding quickly bumped up 
against a series of indications from the Court that the case was per-
haps intended as a less dramatic shift than it first appeared.  Just two 
terms later, the Court clarified Chevron’s import in this respect.  In INS 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca,145 the Court rejected a statutory interpretation of-
fered by the federal Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and empha-
sized the extent to which the Court retains interpretive primacy.146  It 
also made clear the potential frequency with which the Court could 
decide matters of interpretation at Chevron’s first step: 
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and 
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear con-
gressional intent.  If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory con-
struction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise ques-
tion at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.
147
  
If, as in Cardoza-Fonseca, the statute’s text and ordinary canons of 
construction persuade the Court that the statute is clear, the agency’s 
view is irrelevant.  Justice Scalia wrote separately, insisting that the 
Court’s purported clarification was in fact an “evisceration of Che-
vron.”148  If the Court is able to ignore an agency’s statutory interpreta-
tion any time the Court thinks it can glean the meaning of the statute 
on its own, Chevron is no more than a “doctrine of desperation.”149  As 
 
scribing Chevron and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), as giving 
broad discretion to the executive to choose how to interpret statutes). 
143 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
144 Id. at 866. 
145 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
146 Id. at 448 (rejecting the interpretation put forward by the Immigration Judge 
and BIA). 
147 Id. at 447-48 (citations omitted in Cardoza-Fonseca) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843 n.9) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148 Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
149 Id.  
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it turned out, Justice Scalia was hardly alone in assessing the case as a 
challenge to the revolutionary view of Chevron.150 
The years since Cardoza-Fonseca have seen the development of a 
line of decisions that further limit the range of cases in which Chevron 
guides judicial engagement with agency interpretation.151  United States 
v. Mead Corp., for instance, presented the question of whether a tariff 
classification ruling by the U.S. Customs Service was entitled to Che-
vron deference.152  The Court held that it was not.153  In the Court’s 
view, there was no indication in the agency’s ruling letter that the 
agency “ever set out with a lawmaking pretense in mind when it un-
dertook to make classifications like these.”154  Mead thus clarified the 
existence of what scholars have since called Chevron step zero.155  That 
is, before the Court considers whether a statute is ambiguous, it must 
determine (not just assume) that Congress intended to delegate the 
agency the power to issue rules with the force of law and that the 
agency interpretation to which deference is claimed was in fact prom-
ulgated in the exercise of that power.156  In the absence of such an ex-
press delegation of legislative power, Chevron does not apply.  Instead, 
the Court would employ the more flexible, pre-Chevron doctrine of at-
tention to executive views outlined in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.157—that 
agency views are entitled to respect “to the extent that those interpreta-
tions have the ‘power to persuade.’”158  As the Mead Court put it, “The 
 
150 See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 11, at 2604 (“Taken on its face, 
Cardoza-Fonseca seems to be an effort to restore the pre-Chevron status quo by asserting 
the primacy of the judiciary on purely legal questions.”). 
151 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that 
Chevron deference only applies to statutory interpretation where Congress delegates 
the agency authority to make rules with “the force of law”); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that interpretations in opinion letters do not war-
rant Chevron deference because, like interpretations in policy statements, manuals, or 
guidelines, they lack the force of law).  
152 Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. 
153 Id. 
154 Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.  The Court supported this conclusion with the observa-
tions that “Customs does not generally engage in notice-and-comment practice when 
issuing [ruling letters], and their treatment by the agency makes it clear that a letter’s 
binding character as a ruling stops short of third parties.”  Id. 
155 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 833, 873 (2001). 
156 Id. 
157 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
158 Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. 
at 140); see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (“[T]he rulings, interpretations and opinions of 
the [agency administrator], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their au-
thority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and 
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fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has 
been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to 
the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative 
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”159 
At the same time, the Court has also moved to limit Chevron defe-
rence based on a new theory that seems to turn Chevron’s political-
accountability rationale on its head.  Consider FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp.,160 in which tobacco companies challenged the 
authority of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to issue a rule 
regulating tobacco as a drug (and thereby limiting its marketing to 
children).  Rejecting the FDA’s interpretation of its own authority as 
extending to the regulation of tobacco products, a bare majority of 
the Court effectively explained its decision not to defer to the agency 
on the grounds that some issues were too political to be left to the 
more political branch.161  Foreshadowing Mead, the Court explained 
that where the “history and the breadth of the authority that the FDA 
has asserted” would give it the power to ban cigarettes entirely, ending 
a multibillion dollar industry and the manufacture of a product with a 
“unique political history” in the United States, Congress would have 
been much clearer than it was in expressing its intent to delegate to 
the agency such authority in the statute.162  Given the political stakes, 
the Court preferred its own, highly contextual construction of the sta-
tute (ironically attributing the result to Congress) to that of the FDA—
the agency’s superior political accountability notwithstanding.163 
 
litigants may properly resort for guidance.  The weight of such a judgment in a particu-
lar case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those fac-
tors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). 
159 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (footnotes omitted).  
160 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
161 See id. at 125-26 (holding, in a 5–4 decision, that the Court would not defer to 
the FDA on the question of whether Congress meant to delegate the agency the power 
to regulate tobacco as a drug). 
162 Id. at 159-60. 
163 See id. at 126-27 (noting that the FDA rulemaking that produced the tobacco 
regulation followed the FDA’s receipt of more than 700,000 public submissions, “more 
than ‘at any other time in its history on any other subject’” (quoting Regulations Re-
stricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,418 (Aug. 28, 
1996))).  The dissent rejected the notion that relative political accountability between 
an executive agency and Congress made any difference in such a case.  See id. at 190-91 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Insofar as the decision to regulate tobacco reflects the policy 
of an administration, it is a decision for which that administration, and those politically 
elected officials who support it, must (and will) take responsibility. . . . I do not believe 
that an administrative agency decision of this magnitude—one that is important, con-
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The extraordinary-cases principle seems to cut to the core of what 
made Chevron seem so radical.  If the Court’s awareness of its limited 
political accountability were Chevron’s primary raison d’etre, one would 
assume that it would be precisely in these extraordinary cases that the 
Court’s deference to the judgment of the political branches would be at 
its height.  Yet however counterintuitive its rationale (at least from this 
perspective), the extraordinary-cases exception has now appeared more 
than once.  Both in refusing to defer to the Attorney General’s finding 
that doctors assisting terminally ill patients to commit suicide pursuant 
to an Oregon law would be subject to prosecution under the federal 
Controlled Substances Act,164 and in rejecting the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency’s interpretation that it lacked the statutory authority to 
regulate greenhouse gases,165 the Court has denied Chevron deference 
on the grounds that Congress could not have intended to delegate in-
terpretive power of such political salience.  As the Court put it most 
memorably, Congress “‘does not alter the fundamental details of a reg-
ulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one 
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’”166 
The Court’s most recent Chevron decisions have reinforced that its 
formal interpretive power extends even to cases titularly falling under 
Chevron.  These cases also appear to embrace the Skidmore-type view 
that what determines the weight accorded the executive’s interpreta-
tion is not merely that it comes from the executive, but that it comes 
from a process or with a record that renders the interpretation persu-
asive on its own terms.  In Negusie v. Holder, for instance, the Court re-
viewed the Board of Immigration Affairs’s (BIA’s) interpretation of a 
statute that was, by the Court’s own assessment, ambiguous.167  The 
Court thus noted at the outset that Chevron deference would apply:  as 
long as the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, the Court would 
defer to the agency view.168  Indeed, as Justice Kennedy wrote for the 
 
spicuous, and controversial—can escape the kind of public scrutiny that is essential in 
any democracy.  And such a review will take place whether it is the Congress or the Ex-
ecutive Branch that makes the relevant decision.”).  
164 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (holding that the Attorney 
General’s interpretation was not due Chevron deference). 
165 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533-34 (2007) (finding the EPA’s re-
fusal to determine whether greenhouse gases cause climate change to be arbitrary 
and capricious). 
166 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267 (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 
U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).  
167 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164 (2009). 
168 Id. at 1163-66. 
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majority:  “Judicial deference in the immigration context is of special 
importance, for executive officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political 
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’”169  Yet the 
Court then proceeded to reject the BIA’s reading of the relevant sta-
tute as a mistake in interpretation, concluding that in its case-by-case 
application of the statute, the agency had erroneously thought itself 
bound by an earlier Supreme Court case:  “The BIA deemed its inter-
pretation to be mandated by [the Court’s earlier decision in] Fedorenko, 
and that error prevented it from a full consideration of the statutory 
question here presented.”170  The BIA had thus not actually exercised 
its interpretive authority but simply determined that Fedorenko controls. 
The Court’s reasoning in Negusie is a puzzle in several respects.  
First, it is not at all clear what distance exists between “exercising in-
terpretive authority” and applying law an agency believes to be bind-
ing.  Applying relevant precedent would seem to be part and parcel of 
exercising interpretive authority.  As long as agency interpretation of 
precedent is “reasonable,” it should receive Chevron deference.  Per-
haps to avoid this dilemma, Justice Kennedy’s opinion turned Chevron 
upside down:  “Whether [the agency] interpretation would be reason-
able, and thus owed Chevron deference, is a legitimate question; but it 
is not now before us.”171  Chevron, of course, would have the Court in-
quire first as to whether the statute was ambiguous—a determination 
that it had already made in this case.  Having decided that the statute 
was ambiguous, the Court’s only remaining inquiry under Chevron was 
to the reasonableness of the BIA’s interpretation.  The Court did not 
engage in this inquiry.  It therefore seems that the Court was not ap-
plying Chevron in any direct sense.  Instead, the Court emphasized 
that, statutory ambiguity notwithstanding, the agency had not done 
enough to justify Skidmore deference.  In remanding the case to the 
agency to try again to exercise its “Chevron discretion,” the Court was 
expressly prescriptive.  It held that the agency must “‘bring its exper-
tise to bear upon the matter; . . . evaluate the evidence; . . . make an 
initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed dis-
cussion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its decision 
 
169 Id. at 1163-64 (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).  As Justice 
Kennedy explained:  “The Attorney General’s decision to bar an alien who has partici-
pated in persecution ‘may affect our relations with [the alien’s native] country or its 
neighbors.  The judiciary is not well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for 
assessing the likelihood and importance of such diplomatic repercussions.’”  Id. at 
1164-65 (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)).  
170 Id. at 1166. 
171 Id. 
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exceeds the leeway that the law provides.”172  In short, the agency view 
was relevant not per se but only insofar as it could contribute some-
thing to the task of interpretation that the Court itself could not. 
Regardless whether it is fair to say the Court has replaced Chevron 
with, as Justice Scalia put it, “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test,”173 
it is hard to argue that the Chevron doctrine is settled.  The Court does 
not afford agencies deference every time an ambiguous statute is before 
it.  The Court remains interested in, and determined to engage, a varie-
ty of functional factors in weighing the relevance and persuasiveness of 
executive views in a growing range of circumstances:  where Congress 
has not delegated power to issue rules with the force of law, where the 
political consequences of the interpretive question are too important to 
leave to the broad discretion of an executive agency, and, as ever, where 
the Court feels capable of managing the interpretive task on its own.  
Political accountability matters, but so do subject-matter expertise and a 
reasoned decisionmaking process that takes that expertise into account.  
In Chevron and thereafter, the Court has asserted a strong, if incom-
pletely theorized, sense of its own formal authority to say what the law 
is—both within the confines of the doctrine and without.  In short, Che-
vron does not seem likely to serve as a panacea for interpretive confu-
sion if imported into the realm of foreign relations law. 
2.  Chevron’s Functional Failings 
While foreign relations scholars may be overly optimistic about 
the ability of Chevron to bring doctrinal clarity to the allocation of in-
terpretive authority between the Court and the executive, they are 
right to consider the role of functional interests, such as expertise and 
accountability, in assessing how the Court should engage executive in-
terpretations of law.  To the extent that sharing duties in law interpre-
tation raises separation-of-powers concerns, functional analysis is often 
unavoidable—and it is sometimes required to understand the struc-
tural provisions of the Constitution.174  Sunstein and Posner may be 
 
172 Id. at 1167-68 (quoting Gonzalez v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186-87 (2006) (per 
curiam)).  Indeed, Justice Kennedy noted “[t]hese matters may have relevance in de-
termining whether its statutory interpretation is a permissible one.”  Id.  
173 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
There are, of course, some cases in which the Court has pursued a more straightfor-
ward application of Chevron.  See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-22 (2002) 
(applying the Chevron two-step test to determine whether to defer to the Social Security 
Administration’s interpretation of a statutory definition).   
174 Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1571-86 (2009).  
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faulted for paying insufficient attention to the protection of individual 
rights as a functional interest in separation of powers, with an equal or 
greater claim to structural priority than interests in accountability and 
expertise.175  Their claims may also overstate the executive’s institu-
tional competence to handle security matters with minimal involve-
ment of the other branches.176  But Sunstein and Posner are right that 
functional interests in accountability and expertise are at least as sa-
lient in matters of national security and foreign relations as they are in 
traditional administrative law.177 
It is worth pausing on this conclusion, for it runs counter to past 
assumptions that “[t]he propriety of deference may well vary depend-
ing on the type of law at issue.”178  Indeed, there are increasingly 
strong reasons to doubt both the descriptive and normative validity of 
such subject-matter exceptionalism.  The modern national security 
bureaucracy, like more traditional administrative settings, channels 
decisionmaking through a set of existing organizations and agencies, 
each with its own highly elaborated set of professional norms and re-
sponsibilities, standard processes, identities and culture.179  At the 
 
175 See, e.g., 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 350 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1968) (“The true prin-
ciple of government is this—make the system complete in its structure, give a perfect 
proportion and balance to its parts, and the powers you give it will never affect your 
security.” (quoting Alexander Hamilton)); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James 
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“The accumulation of all powers legislative, ex-
ecutive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether 
hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.”); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“This Court 
consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Fra-
mers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of govern-
mental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liber-
ty.”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 
549 & n.42 (1998 ed.) (citing John Jay for the proposition that separation of powers 
could help avoid governmental tyranny).  The unsupported assertion in Posner and 
Sunstein’s article that “critics and supporters agree that changes in the global envi-
ronment justify at least some expansion of executive powers,” Posner & Sunstein, supra 
note 3, at 1210, is particularly striking in this regard.  See, for example, infra note 261 
for articles by Kim Scheppele and Martin Flaherty taking the opposite view.  
176 See Pearlstein, supra note 174, at 1592 (suggesting that detention regimes, for 
example, may benefit from multibranch participation). 
177 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1207. 
178 Bradley, supra note 11, at 651.  
179 See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power:  Interro-
gation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1274-79 (2006) (describing the Ameri-
can military’s “professionalism”—that is, “the institutional acquisition and mainten-
ance of a set of technical skills, norms, and ethics”—as a “defining feature”); 
Pearlstein, supra note 174, at 1608 (stating that organization theorists recognize the 
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same time, the growing set of societal challenges that are counted as a 
threat to “security” may swamp traditional distinctions between policy 
that is “foreign” and “domestic.”180  On functional grounds alone, it is 
increasingly difficult to see why the type of law per se—“foreign” or 
otherwise—should make the executive’s attempts at law interpretation 
more or less worthy of deference. 
But it is this seeming recognition that makes it especially puzzling 
that scholars such as Sunstein and Posner would embrace Chevron as a 
means of ensuring that the Court attends to the views of relevant ex-
perts.  As Sunstein and Posner acknowledge, “[A]n agency receives 
Chevron deference even if the Administrator decides on a course of 
conduct that departs from the views of her informed staff.  Courts do 
not look behind the agency’s process to explore who, exactly, influ-
enced the decision and to what extent.”181  If one accepts the view that 
the executive’s key strength is its expertise on certain questions arising 
in foreign relations law, one would presumably wish to insist that the 
actual experts inside the executive branch be consulted.  It is, as Suns-
tein and Posner note, the State Department—not, for example, White 
House Counsel’s office—that most carefully tracks U.S. relations with 
foreign states.182  Indeed, it is in part because of Chevron’s limitation in 
this regard that the Court has sometimes declined to apply it, even in 
the standard administrative law realm.  The Court’s decision in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA,183 for instance, reflects this view.  Declining to afford 
Chevron deference to the agency’s decision not to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions, the Court emphasized the limited persuasiveness of the 
agency’s reasoning.  In particular, according to the Court, the EPA had 
not consulted with the State Department before taking the position 
“that regulating greenhouse gases might impair the President’s ability 
 
significant benefits of “strict bureaucratic control, intense socialization, and a highly 
developed sense of organizational culture” for government structures tasked with pre-
venting high-consequence risk). 
180 See U.N. SEC’Y-GEN.’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND 
CHANGE, A MORE SECURE WORLD:  OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, at 9, U.N. Sales No. 
E.05.I.5 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report3.pdf (finding that 
the biggest security threats facing the world now include “poverty, infectious disease 
and environmental degradation”).  
181 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1214. 
182 See id. at 1205 (“[T]he nature of the relationship with the foreign state, the cul-
tural norms of that state, its legal system and other institutions, its politics, and so 
forth . . . are factors followed and assessed by the Department of State.”). 
183 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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to negotiate with ‘key developing nations’ to reduce emissions.”184  So, 
too, it may have mattered to the Hamdan Court that the Judge Advocate 
General corps of military attorneys inside the Pentagon had not en-
gaged (and did not support) the President’s view of the necessity of mil-
itary commissions.185  Where expertise matters, the Court seems to rec-
ognize that there are more effective ways of ensuring its inclusion than 
reviewing the general “reasonableness” of “executive” views per se.186 
The remaining functional reason for preferring Chevron in the 
foreign relations setting would be if one assumed—as Chevron original-
ly appeared to187—that the functional value of political accountability 
is more important than any other functional value in allocating inter-
pretive power, including that of expertise.  But there is no clear rea-
son to think accountability should be given functional superiority in 
this sense.  Compared to functional interests in protecting individual 
rights or promoting expertise and effectiveness, political accountabili-
ty has seemed a marginal concern among those functional interests 
identified in the Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence, appear-
ing in dissents more often than in majorities.188  More to the point, 
 
184 Id. at 533-34 (citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and En-
gines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003)).  The Court went on to reason, 
[EPA] has offered a laundry list of reasons not to regulate. . . . Although we 
have neither the expertise nor the authority to evaluate these policy judg-
ments, it is evident they . . . [do not] amount to a reasoned justification for 
declining to form a scientific judgment. . . . In the Global Climate Protection 
Act of 1987, Congress authorized the State Department—not EPA—to formu-
late United States foreign policy with reference to environmental matters re-
lating to climate.  EPA has made no showing that it issued the ruling in ques-
tion here after consultation with the State Department. 
Id. 
185 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld:  The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 105-06 (2006) (suggesting that the Hamdan Court might have 
appropriately deferred to the executive if the executive could have presented its inter-
pretation “as the product of deliberative and sober bureaucratic decisionmaking”).  
186 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (finding that 
courts have considered, among many factors, the agency’s relative expertise and the 
“persuasiveness” of its position to decide what deference it deserves). 
187 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984) (“[F]ederal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legiti-
mate policy choices made by those who do.”).   
188 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 421-22 (1989) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the Court’s holding that the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion does not upset separation of powers is an “undemocratic precedent” that could 
lead to further Congressional delegation of lawmaking to commissions that are not 
accountable to the political process); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 731 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he difference is the difference that the Founders envi-
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there is some reason to think that “deference” to the executive in 
some foreign relations settings will undermine, rather than enhance, 
political accountability.  The notion that the executive is substantially 
more politically accountable than the courts may be especially ques-
tionable in the national security context.189  Whereas in other realms 
of administrative law it may be plausible to argue that major agency 
decisions will enjoy “the kind of public scrutiny that is essential in any 
democracy,”190 appropriate government interests in secrecy surround-
ing certain aspects of national security may make it impossible for po-
litical accountability checks to function effectively.  “That is, it is pre-
cisely because security sometimes requires secrecy that the involvement 
of more than one branch may be required to make popular accounta-
bility possible at all.”191  Taking functional interests seriously, it is thus 
possible to conclude—as the Court increasingly has in traditional ad-
ministrative law—that Chevron is at times too blunt an instrument for 
taking those interests into account. 
3.  The Persistent Formal Dilemma 
While functional concerns understandably tend to dominate the 
question of judicial deference in foreign relations law, perhaps the 
greatest challenge to the successful importation of Chevron into for-
eign relations law is a formal one.  Chevron’s attempt to negotiate the 
formal sharing of interpretive power between the courts and the ex-
ecutive remains one of the great unsettled debates of the modern ad-
ministrative state.  Indeed, as Chevron’s critics argued, when the Court 
does something less than determine for itself what the law is, it is ced-
ing interpretive power that the Framers of the Constitution intended 
 
sioned when they established a single Chief Executive accountable to the people:  the 
blame can be assigned to someone who can be punished.”).   
189 See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1246 & n.58 (questioning the effectiveness of 
political accountability in the foreign affairs context); Pearlstein, supra note 174, at 
1575-79 (noting that the government interest in secrecy surrounding some national 
security matters may make political checks on the executive that depend on transpa-
rency less effective). 
190 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190-91 (2000) (Brey-
er, J., dissenting); cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2331-32 (2001) (“Presidential administration promotes accountability in two principal 
and related ways.  First, presidential leadership enhances transparency, enabling the 
public to comprehend more accurately the sources and nature of bureaucratic power.  
Second, presidential leadership establishes an electoral link between the public and 
the bureaucracy, increasing the latter’s responsiveness to the former.”). 
191 Pearlstein, supra note 174, at 1578. 
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to reserve to the Article III courts.192  A large swath of administrative 
law scholarship since Chevron has thus been occupied with explaining 
how any sharing of interpretive duties is consistent with the presumed 
first-order allocation of interpretive authority to the Article III courts.193  
These theories shall be considered in detail in the Part that follows. 
Despite this, most scholarship arguing in favor of interpretive de-
ference in the foreign relations context has been little troubled by 
such formal concerns.  This is not to suggest that there has been no 
acknowledgement of Marbury v. Madison and related formal concep-
tions of the judicial role.  To the contrary, as Curtis Bradley has useful-
ly summarized, the “Marbury perspective” has been expressed by a 
number of foreign relations law scholars, typically in objecting to de-
ference on the basis of the executive’s functional claims of superiority 
in matters of national security.194  Yet while the passing formal asser-
tion that the judicial role is to “say what the law is”195 may have been a 
reasonable—and reasonably stark—reply to the most expansive histor-
ical claims of executive power,196 it seems an insufficient account of 
the role of the courts in the modern administrative state.  Since Che-
vron in particular, the Court has, at least to some extent, shared the 
job of “saying what the law is,” occasionally deferring to “reasonable” 
agency interpretations in realms of administrative law hardly limited 
to foreign relations.  Since Hamdan especially, there can no longer be 
a question that the Court intends to assert its formal power in foreign 
relations law as well.  Just as administrative law has had to confront 
what such deference means for the modern judicial role beyond Mar-
bury, foreign relations law must recognize that as long as the courts re-
tain any independent interpretive authority in reviewing statutes and 
 
192 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 17, at 525 (noting tension between Chevron’s defe-
rence regime and the judiciary’s authority to determine statutory meaning).  
193 See infra Part II.  
194 Bradley, supra note 11, at 650 & n.2 (“[C]ommentators [who express the ‘Mar-
bury perspective’] typically frame [the issue of deference in foreign affairs cases] as a 
choice between two extremes:  either the courts in foreign affairs cases enforce the 
‘rule of law’ against the Executive or they abdicate their judicial function.”) (citing, 
inter alia, FRANCK, supra note 38, at 4-5 (1992), and HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:  SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 
148 (1990)); see also generally Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpre-
tation, 50 VILL. L. REV. 25 (2005) (opposing deference to the executive’s interpretation 
of treaties on formal grounds). 
195 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
196 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(describing the President as the “sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations”).  
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treaties, there must be a theory of the “judicial power”—and an asso-
ciated doctrine of deference, vel non—that explains how the interpre-
tive role may be shared. 
While embracing the administrative law model in many respects, 
and indeed suggesting that the Court extend Chevron so that it might 
defer to the executive’s interpretation in foreign relations cases even 
when the underlying law is not ambiguous, Sunstein and Posner offer 
only passing formal defense of their argument.  To the extent that 
they address formal constraints, Sunstein and Posner note that any 
legislative “grant of authority to the executive in the domain of for-
eign affairs ought generally to include a power of interpretation.”197  
Presumably, the authors mean that the Court should construe any 
treaty or foreign relations statute as implicitly delegating interpretive 
power.  Yet such a delegation theory faces several hurdles.  For exam-
ple, it is not at all clear what “interpretive” power Congress has to del-
egate, as the Court has regularly drawn lines between the constitu-
tional function of lawmaking and law interpreting.198  Congress surely 
possesses the former, but not so obviously the latter.  Indeed, it is for 
this reason that the more persuasive formal explanation for Chevron 
has been one that understands Congress as having delegated lawmak-
ing power to the agencies (whether that delegation is express or im-
plied).199  As long as this is the case, executive agencies engaged in the 
business of statutory construction in the course of implementing Con-
gress’s instructions need not intrude on the judicial power at all; they 
 
197 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1198. 
198 See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998) (“We have 
often observed, however, that ‘the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous 
basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.’” (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat’l 
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963))); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 
U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (“[S]ubsequent legislative history is a ‘hazardous basis for infer-
ring the intent of an earlier’ Congress.” (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 
313 (1960))); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,  
N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (“‘[W]e have observed on more than one occasion that 
the interpretation given by one Congress . . . to an earlier statute is of little assistance 
in discerning the meaning of that statute.’” (quoting Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. 
Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989))); United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 
(1968) (“[T]he views of one Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted many 
years before by another Congress have ‘very little, if any, significance.’” (quoting Rain-
water v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958))). 
199 See Monaghan, supra note 24 at 25-26 (“Judicial deference to agency ‘interpre-
tation’ of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to 
an agency.” (emphasis omitted)); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
226-27 (2001) (“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision 
qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to 
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law . . . .”). 
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are acting only as a more detail-oriented extension of Congress itself.  
The notion that executive agencies post-Chevron are carrying out a 
core judicial function of law interpretation would present a far greater 
challenge to the formal judicial power than Sunstein and Posner’s 
thesis appears to contemplate.  In an era when the delegation doc-
trine, long thought dead, continues to find judicial support in various 
forms,200 the authors’ proposed solution risks the criticism that their 
functional cure will kill the formal patient. 
Importing Chevron into the foreign relations setting without at-
tempting to address the question of judicial power only perpetuates 
the formal interpretive debate.  Particularly because the formal alloca-
tion of foreign relations power between the judicial and executive 
branches—unlike the more novel authority of administrative agen-
cies—is a subject of express constitutional concern, it seems essential 
to have a formal theory of how interpretive power may be shared in 
this realm before designing a deference doctrine that effectively 
shares it.  Once a “case or controversy” is properly before an Article III 
court, is there a formal floor of judicial power to interpret statutes and 
treaties, beneath which no functional deference rationale can allow 
the Court to sink?  The remainder of the Article explores answers to 
this question of formal power in an attempt to shed light on which 
non-Chevron approach is appropriate. 
II.  CONSIDERING FORMAL THEORIES OF THE JUDICIAL POWER 
The text of Article III of the Constitution is notoriously short on 
elaboration of what, precisely, is contained in the “judicial power of 
 
200 For example, in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, the Court gave voice to 
delegation concerns in rejecting the notion that an agency could cure an unlawful del-
egation of legislative power by giving the statute a narrow construction.  See 531 U.S. 
457, 473 (2001) (“The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise—that is to 
say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted—would itself be an ex-
ercise of the forbidden legislative authority.  Whether the statute delegates legislative 
power is a question for the courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing 
upon the answer.”).  Beyond this, there seems broad agreement that nondelegation 
concerns continue to manifest themselves in interpretive canons against delegation.  
See infra note 238 (discussing the nondelegation canon).  There also remain periodic 
signs elsewhere that the Court has retained an interest in policing formal structural 
constraints.  Since Chevron, the Court has continued to produce decisions insisting that 
formal lines are drawn between and among the branches.  See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 
478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (rejecting a statute through which Congress vested execu-
tive powers in an agency official but reserved for itself the power to remove him from 
office); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (invalidating the so-called legislative 
veto of executive agency action).   
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the United States.”201  Chief Justice John Marshall’s attempt in Marbury 
v. Madison202 to put flesh on the bare bones of this power made some 
of its features clear, but arguably obscured others.  While Marbury fa-
mously established that it was “the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is,”203 it also suggested that there were 
some executive actions that might not be amenable to judicial invali-
dation.204  Moreover, while Marbury is understood to focus on why it is 
appropriate for the Court not only to engage in, but also to assert su-
premacy over, constitutional interpretation,205 the opinion devotes not a 
moment to justifying the Court’s power to interpret the acts of Con-
gress also at issue in the case. 
In some respects, this relative inattention makes sense.  Judicial 
interpretation of subconstitutional law arguably raises fewer concerns 
about the legitimacy of the judiciary, as it lacks the finality, and there-
fore the supremacy, associated with constitutional interpretation.  If 
the regular democratic process has some capacity to fix any judicial 
mistake in the interpretation of a statute or treaty, then one need not 
worry as much about finding a democratic justification for judicial 
power.  Yet it is still necessary to define the contours of the judicial 
power to interpret statutes and treaties to understand when the Court 
can decline to exercise its power or otherwise share power with 
another branch to interpret the law in cases properly before it.  Large-
ly in response to this need, presented most acutely by the rise of mod-
ern administrative law, scholars have explored a series of theories 
based variously on constitutional text and original meaning, as well as 
public choice and democratic theory, to explain why and to what ex-
tent judges have the power to say what subconstitutional law means.  
 
201 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
202 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
203 Id. at 177. 
204 See id. at 165-66 (“By the constitution of the United States, the President is in-
vested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his 
own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to 
his own conscience.  To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to 
appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.  In 
such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the 
manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no 
power to control that discretion.  The subjects are political.  They respect the nation, 
not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the execu-
tive is conclusive.”). 
205 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPRE-
MACY 2 (2007) (“[Marbury v. Madison asserted] a strong claim to judicial authority over 
the interpretation of constitutional meaning.”). 
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This Part reviews the two leading accounts of judicial interpretive pow-
er:  faithful agent theory and what is often called instrumental theory.  
It concludes that while each account is instructive—and instrumental 
theory especially useful—neither ultimately seems sufficient for under-
standing the judicial role in interpreting foreign relations law. 
A.  Faithful Agent Theory 
Likely still the dominant understanding of the courts’ role in sta-
tutory interpretation, “faithful agent” theory sees the relationship be-
tween Congress and the courts as that of principal and agent, where 
the agent’s duty is limited to discerning and applying the directions of 
the principal set forth in statute.206  As a theory of the judicial power, 
faithful agent theory has obvious attractions.  The notion that judges 
act only as translators for the democratically elected legislature helps 
to address perennial concerns about the countermajoritarianism of an 
unelected federal judiciary.  Indeed, the historical argument in favor 
of this view, set forth in detail by John Manning, contends that faithful 
agent theory is most consistent with the Constitution’s structural ef-
forts (driven in part by response to Anti-Federalist concerns) to ad-
dress the countermajoritarian problem by limiting judicial discre-
tion.207  Among other structural features, the Constitution’s insistence 
upon bicameralism and presentment made it “difficult to imagine that 
the Founders designed an elaborate method of legislation, while si-
 
206 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 113, 116 (1998) (“[L]egislators are the lawgivers . . . [and so] courts deciding sta-
tutory cases are bound to follow commands and policies embodied in the enacted 
text—commands and policies the courts did not create and cannot change.”); Richard 
A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitu-
tion, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189 (1986) (“In our system of government the fra-
mers of statutes . . . are the superiors of the judges.  The framers communicate orders 
to the judges through legislative texts . . . . If the orders are clear, the judges must obey 
them.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts in 
statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature. . . . The judicial 
task is to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably the legislature.”); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:  Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1990) (“Traditional 
democratic theory suggests that the court interpreting a statute must act as the faithful 
agent of the legislature’s intent.”). 
207 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 85 (2001) (arguing that in debates leading up to the Constitution’s ratification, the 
Federalists invoked the faithful agent notion to counter Anti-Federalist concerns). 
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multaneously granting judges broad independent authority to alter 
the results outside that carefully constructed process.”208 
In Manning’s account, the founding-era Marshall Court recog-
nized the limited nature of the judicial role in this regard:  “[I]t has 
truly been stated to be the duty of the court to effect the intention of 
the legislature.”209  This view led the Court away from the common law 
practice of equitable interpretation—construing otherwise-clear statu-
tory texts to avoid injustice or to remedy textual gaps that seemed in-
consistent with legislative policy.210  Moreover, Manning argues, to the 
extent the Court ever departed from the import of a plain text—by 
applying a substantive canon of interpretation, for example—such 
departures could be understood as necessary to fulfill the legislative 
intent.211  The canons of constitutional avoidance or of guarding 
against excessive delegations of power, for example, may “acquire a 
sort of prescriptive validity, since the legislature presumably has them 
in mind when it chooses its language.”212 
Yet faithful agent theory in other respects struggles to explain the 
use or value of such substantive canons—driven by extralegislative 
values—or the related use of clear statement canons, in which the 
Court requires a clear statement from Congress before interpreting a 
statute, for example, to infringe on state sovereignty or delegate ex-
cessive authority to another branch.  Presumably, the theory could not 
tolerate the use of such canons to trump a reading of a statute whose 
textual meaning is otherwise plain.  It likewise requires some explana-
tion to understand how faithful agent theory could survive an executive 
deference doctrine like Chevron, which seemingly allows an executive 
agency to supplant the Court as the interpretive agent of Congress.  In-
deed, for the faithful agent understanding to work, Chevron must be 
understood not as a doctrine of judicial deference to executive authority, 
but rather as a doctrine of congressional authority alone.  That is, when 
 
208 Id. at 71. 
209 Id. at 91 (quoting Schooner Paulina’s Cargo v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 52, 60 (1812)). 
210 Id. at 92. 
211 Id. at 95-101. 
212 Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 581, 583 (1990); see also John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1553 (2008) (“‘A legislator who votes for . . . a provi-
sion . . . does so on the assumption that . . . what the words mean to him is identical to 
what they will mean to those to whom they are addressed . . . .’” (quoting Jeremy Wal-
dron, Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 
329, 339 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995))). 
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the Court defers to an interpretation by an executive agency, it is defer-
ring only because Congress has delegated the agency the authority of 
an adjunct legislature.213  In this sense, the Court shows no deference at 
all to the executive, but rather just to the legislature-by-proxy. 
Beyond the vigorous criticism to which faithful agent theory has 
been subject on historical and other grounds,214 the theory for this 
reason seems particularly ill-suited to illuminate the judicial task of 
statutory interpretation in foreign relations law.  Indeed, it is not clear 
that the theory leaves room for an executive interpretive role of any 
sort.  Consider the faithful agent understanding of Chevron defe-
rence—an understanding that depends on an assessment of the ex-
ecutive’s superior political accountability as Congress’s delegated 
lawmaker.  Yet political accountability (whether the agency is unders-
tood to be either a legislative delegate or part of an appropriately po-
litical executive administration) has only been part of the rationale for 
doctrines like Chevron.  The other part—one central to the foreign re-
lations context—is the notion that the executive possesses expertise 
that the Court may be wise to take into account, whether or not the 
legislature believes that it should.  In this regard, it seems especially 
difficult to reconcile a view of the Court as a faithful agent to Congress 
with the expectation in foreign relations law that the executive’s views 
have at least some functional relevance to the task of law interpreta-
tion, whether or not Congress thinks they should.215 
Using faithful agent theory to explain the judicial power in treaty 
interpretation is even more suspect.  In the Manning vision, limiting the 
Court’s role to that of faithful agent is necessary to preserve the integri-
ty of the Framers’ scheme that laws would be made only with bicameral 
approval and after presentment to the executive.  Treaties, of course, 
 
213 See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 26 (“Judicial deference to agency ‘interpreta-
tion’ of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an 
agency.” (emphasis omitted)). 
214 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words:  Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 997 (2001) (“[T]he 
original materials surrounding Article III’s judicial power assume an eclectic approach to 
statutory interpretation, open to understanding the letter of a statute in pursuance of the 
spirit of the law and in light of fundamental values.”); Molot, supra note 21, at 73 (sug-
gesting that Chevron deference renders “[statutory] interpretation a political process”). 
215 Faithful agent theory may be subject to attack on formal grounds as well, at 
least from those who conceive of the “executive power” in the foreign relations realm 
as carrying significant interpretive authority of its own. See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond Mar-
bury, supra note 11, at 2595 (suggesting that interpreting unclear terms in a foreign 
relations context may require deference to executive interpretation).  This Article re-
turns to such claims in Part III.    
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emerge from a formally different place, with the treaty-making power 
residing in the executive, but only “by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate.”216  At a minimum, the constitutional text would seem to 
give the executive some claim to a shared, but nonetheless formal, role 
in “making” the treaty law.  Indeed, excluding all evidence of executive 
views in treaty making seems likely to diminish the accuracy of any judi-
cial interpretation.  Moreover, even if the Senate and executive were 
the sole lawmakers involved in treaty making, the absence of House par-
ticipation in treaty ratification weakens the argument that faithful agent 
theory helps preserve bicameral or democratic decisionmaking in any 
pure sense.  In any case, the executive and Senate are not the sole law-
makers involved in making treaties; foreign treaty partners help con-
ceive, negotiate, and draft the legal text.  In this context, it is a mistake 
to view the U.S. government or any of its branches as the sole “princip-
al” lawmaker whose intent the Court must discern.217   
Perhaps more significantly, a faithful agent view of treaty interpreta-
tion is inconsistent with an important theme in the Court’s historical 
approach to treaty interpretation, one that understands the judicial task 
as in part akin to contract interpretation, in which the intent that must 
be discerned is that of the treaty parties.218  In this regard, the claim that 
the Court regularly defers to executive views on the meaning of treaties 
obscures more than it clarifies.219  It is true that the Court has on occa-
sion invoked rhetoric that the views of “the departments of government 
particularly charged with [treaty] negotiation and enforcement” are 
due “great weight.”220  Yet, as the Court noted in the case first invoking 
the “great weight” standard and since, the weight may be accorded not 
only to the views of the executive but to those of all the parties that ne-
gotiated the treaty.221  To the extent that the Court has attended to the 
executive’s views, it is more regularly to the views of both negotiating 
partners as evidence of negotiating intent and of post-ratification per-
formance.  In this context, understanding the Court to be an “agent” of 
the parties seems jarring at best. 
 
216 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
217 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s focus on 
the interpretations of foreign treaty parties, in addition to those of the United States). 
218 See Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921) (“Writers of authority agree that 
treaties are to be interpreted upon the principles which govern the interpretation of 
contracts in writing between individuals . . . .”). 
219 See supra Section I.A (citing scholars advancing this view). 
220 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961). 
221 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.   
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B.  Instrumental Interpretation 
A second model of the judicial power, sometimes called instru-
mental theory, holds that Article III courts were not created to be mere 
agents of Congress.  Rather, the courts were meant to employ quintes-
sentially judicial canons of interpretation and methods of legal reason-
ing that would help both to clarify ambiguous texts and to influence 
legislative drafting over time.222  One of the most thorough recent ac-
counts of this view comes from Jonathan Molot.  He contends that the 
Framers understood judicial reasoning to be at least moderately con-
strained on its own terms by judicial principles such as stare decisis and 
by interpretive canons that drove courts to avoid absurd or unjust re-
sults.223  In this view, courts bring to bear institutional and professional 
norms to help serve rule-of-law interests in consistency, fairness, justice, 
and rationality across the law—in order to “induce legislators to inter-
nalize these judicial values when enacting statutes in the first place.”224  
Such interests were less likely to be reflected in legislation if the law’s 
content was left only to the pull of political constituencies, driven by 
their own specific and immediate needs.225  Moreover, independent 
judicial interpretation of statutes could prompt further public en-
gagement with gaps in statutory meaning, whether the gap results from 
legislative inadvertence or a failure of political compromise.226  In this 
 
222 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 117-18 (noting that the Framers expected 
judges both to “interpret statutes equitably” and to interpret statutes contrary to the 
legislature’s expectations, thereby requiring the legislature to examine the full impact 
of its enactments); Molot, supra note 21, at 3 & n.2 (describing the “instrumentalist” 
approach and citing scholarly analyses). 
223 See Molot, supra note 21, at 34-38 (discussing the interpretive tools that the 
Framers believed were available to the judiciary to discern legislative intent). 
224 Id. at 42. 
225 According to Molot, 
the prospect of judicial interpretation could provide just the ammunition that 
a legislator might need to defeat an unjust or irrational political compromise.  
A legislator might speak in opposition to a proposal that benefits one group at 
the expense of another, for example, not simply because the provision is un-
just or irrational, but also because judges would likely construe the proposed 
provision more strictly than they would an alternative version that benefits 
both groups.  Regardless of the individual legislator’s true motive, the judicial 
perspective would be wielded in favor of fairness and consistency in the legis-
lative process.  
Id. at 48 (footnote omitted).  See also Molot, supra note 141, at 1301 (“[J]udges nonethe-
less strive for stability and consistency over time in a way that political officials do not.”). 
 226 Molot describes the judiciary’s role as follows: 
When the judiciary draws boundaries between legislative enactments and ex-
ecutive leeway, it provides a benchmark for deliberation in the political 
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sense, courts’ transparent exercise of the interpretive function could 
also serve a democracy-forcing function, helping to clarify the law (and 
thereby to promote the rule of law) over time. 
Much in an instrumentalist theory of judicial power seems salient 
in foreign relations law.  On formal grounds, there is the promise that 
judicial involvement could help reinforce a structural constitutional 
scheme that contemplates Congress and the executive sharing power 
in foreign relations.227  Although the Constitution grants Congress any 
number of broad textual powers that seem to contemplate its en-
gagement in and regulation of U.S. foreign affairs,228 scholars have 
long lamented Congress’s cession of power to the executive on many 
questions of foreign relations.  This phenomenon may derive from 
political dynamics that tend to give the executive disproportionate po-
litical credit for engagement in foreign relations successes, while en-
suring that both political branches are blamed for foreign relations 
failures.229  But whether Congress’s reticence is driven by constitution-
al conviction or political fear (or some other institutional failing), it 
 
process.  It tells legislators what they must do to bind administrators and tells 
citizens what they must do to comply with legislative instructions.  By provid-
ing such a backdrop for public officials and private citizens, judicial interpre-
tation tends to reinforce legislative authority and the rule of law. 
Molot, supra note 141, at 1317. 
227 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 54-56 (1993) (suggesting 
that the courts should induce Congress to check a presidential decision to go to war); 
KOH, supra note 194, at 123-32 (discussing congressional acquiescence to the execu-
tive’s foreign policy initiatives in the wake of Cold War conflicts); ARTHUR M. SCHLE-
SINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 58-60 (1973) (chronicling the early erosion of 
the legislative check on executive war powers).   
228 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress the power, inter alia, to declare war, 
define and punish offenses against the law of nations, and raise and support armies). 
229 See THEODORE J. LOWI & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:  FREE-
DOM AND POWER 289-93 (1990) (describing the effects of executive action vis-à-vis for-
eign policy on presidential approval ratings); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERAL-
ISM 146 (2d ed. 1979) (“If the president can revive his major resource, his public 
following, with almost any international act with which he can clearly associate himself, 
then he must always be under some pressure to prefer such actions.”).  As Justice Jack-
son put it with characteristic eloquence:  
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the hands 
of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems.  A crisis that 
challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges Congress.  
If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napole-
on that “The tools belong to the man who can use them.”  We may say that 
power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only 
Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring). 
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may be prompted into action by judicial insistence that Congress 
reengage in matters of foreign relations. 
Indeed, Congress has demonstrated its capacity to respond when 
it dislikes the interpretive efforts of the Court.230  The question about 
the legality of executive-made military commissions as a forum for war 
crimes trials in Hamdan is only a more recent example.  The issue in 
Hamdan revolved around the President’s authorization of the use of 
military commissions in late 2001.231  For five years thereafter, Con-
gress remained silent while the executive branch made repeated ef-
forts to refine the commission structure in the face of vigorous objec-
tions.  The Court’s 2006 decision in Hamdan—holding, inter alia, that 
the President lacked the authority to convene such commissions with-
out express congressional authorization232—compelled the executive 
to seek engagement by Congress.  Congress thus entered a heated pub-
lic debate on the question and ultimately passed a detailed statute au-
thorizing the use of military commissions.233  While the resulting Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006 may be criticized on various levels, there 
is little question that it was the Court’s engagement that forced serious 
legislative consideration of the parameters of commission trials.  In this 
regard, judicial involvement promoted the structural value of political 
accountability:  the Court’s action forced a transparent debate in Con-
gress, rather than leaving the resolution of core questions of meaning 
to far less transparent executive branch processes, where secrecy may 
readily disable accountability checks. 
There is also much to be said about the utility of judicial pressure 
on the political branches to clarify foreign relations law and legal texts 
over time.  Consider recent judicial efforts to interpret the AUMF, 
which Congress enacted in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 
2001.234  Given the relatively sparse legislative history and other stan-
 
230 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 339 & 
n.115 (2000) (noting that Congress will legislate in response to judicial decisions); see 
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 
101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (discussing the phenomenon).  
231 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594-95 (2006) (stating that the 
Court’s task was to determine whether presidential authorization of military com-
missions was justified). 
232 See id. at 612-13 (“These simply are not the circumstances in which . . . a mili-
tary commission established by Executive Order . . . may lawfully try a person and sub-
ject him to punishment.”). 
233 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified 
as amended at 10, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
234 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).  
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dard interpretive sources that usually help courts discern the meaning 
of statutes, some scholars have suggested that historical executive 
branch practice should be explored to shed light on statutory mean-
ing.235  If the President has interpreted force-authorization language 
one way in the past—and especially if Congress has acquiesced in that 
interpretation over time—then a later Congress could employ the 
same language comfortable in the knowledge that executive imple-
mentation would accurately reflect its intent.236   
Yet, as the Court itself has recognized, reliance on acquiescence to 
past practice is fraught with problems that range from functional con-
cerns about interpreting legislative silence to formal problems of ac-
cording the same authority to congressional silences as to congres-
sional legislation that has satisfied the important hurdles of bicameral 
debate and presentment to the executive.237  In the foreign relations 
context, it may be especially unclear whether a particular executive 
action is taken pursuant to an executive understanding of statutory 
delegation, or based on the executive’s view of its own constitutional 
authority.  And particularly if one believes modern security threats are 
categorically different from past dangers, it is not at all evident that 
past executive practice offers clarification in this realm.  In contrast, a 
legislature acting in the shadow of clearer judicial expectations—or 
any guidance—in drafting statutes might facilitate legislative use-of-
force debates, crystallizing differences in circumstances when prompt 
resolution may be important. 
While adopting an instrumental theory of judicial power in for-
eign relations law may thus have considerable advantages, a purely in-
strumental view of structural judicial power leaves open some impor-
tant questions for deference doctrine in foreign relations.  A first set 
of questions goes to the permissibility of deference of any kind to ex-
ecutive views in statutory interpretation.  The instrumentalist court’s 
duty to ensure that legislative drafting is informed by rule-of-law values 
would seem to preclude much attention to executive views at any 
stage.  Limiting judicial engagement in the interpretation of legal 
questions properly before the courts would curtail the infusion into 
 
235 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2085-88 (noting that “[c]ourts often 
rely on past Executive Branch practice to inform the meaning of a federal statute”). 
236 See id. at 2085. 
237 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 91 
(1988) (“For every case where the Court rhapsodizes about deliberative inaction, there is 
a counter-case subjecting such inferences to scathing critique.  ‘To explain the cause of 
non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative 
unrealities’ . . . .” (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940))).  
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lawmaking of judicial values that instrumentalists would maintain the 
Framers expected the courts to promote.  Instrumental theory might 
well tolerate judicial consideration of executive views (short of legal 
deference) for functional reasons—a Skidmore-like attention to the 
formal process, relative expertise, and persuasiveness of the execu-
tive’s position.  But it is difficult to see instrumental theory as readily 
reconcilable with even Chevron—much less Curtiss-Wright—deference 
to executive views.  If instrumental theory as such is right, superdefe-
rence regimes are likely wrong. 
Perhaps more importantly, instrumental theory leaves central 
questions about the relationship between the interpretive power of 
the courts and the executive unanswered.  In particular, it does little 
to resolve the role of substantive canons of statutory construction, 
which faithful agent theory at least explains as fair inferences of legis-
lative intent.238  Would instrumental theory tolerate, require, or forbid 
an avoidance canon that requires a clear legislative statement before 
rendering an interpretation that has the effect of delegating power 
from one branch to another?239  The instrumentalist court fulfills its 
duty, it seems, by promoting clarity in the law to serve general inter-
ests in fairness and the rule of law.  In this regard, any weight execu-
tive views may carry could sway judicial decisionmaking, even if the 
executive’s interpretation ran afoul of one of these substantive ca-
nons.  Particularly in foreign relations law, where it has been argued 
that nondelegation canons, for example, may have less salience in the 
face of the executive’s formal constitutional authority,240 it seems im-
portant to understand whether part of the judicial power requires the 
Court to police substantive commitments, as well as interpretive ones. 
 
238 The nondelegation canon disfavors interpretations that would transfer signifi-
cant swaths of discretionary power from one branch to another.  Likewise, the canon 
of constitutional avoidance instructs the Court to disfavor readings that would threaten 
rights protected by the Constitution.  Often invoked in the form of a clear statement 
requirement, such canons provide that the Court shall not construe a statute to in-
fringe on constitutional rights or delegate significant power without a clear statement 
to that effect in the legal text.  These canons may prove dispositive in resolving the 
meaning of a subconstitutional text.  See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in 
the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L. J. 64, 79-80 (2008) (arguing that 
these canons allow courts to constrain congressional action). 
239 A number of scholars have discussed the role of so-called normative canons in 
statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 598 (“A good many 
of the substantive canons of statutory construction are directly inspired by the Constitu-
tion . . . .”); Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2111 (“By using these principles, courts decide 
cases of statutory meaning by reference to something external to legislative desires . . . .”). 
240 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2103-06 (arguing against a clear 
statement requirement on delegation grounds in interpreting the AUMF). 
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Instrumental theory, likewise, seems a partial description at best 
of the Court’s role in treaty interpretation.  It is hard to believe that 
the judicial power in treaty interpretation hinges on the expectation 
that interpretive values pursued by the U.S. judiciary alone are 
meant to have a clear impact on treaty drafting over time.  After all, 
Congress does not hold the treaty-drafting pen, or it holds it only in 
an indirect way.  While the executive certainly has some incentive to 
take Supreme Court interpretive expectations into account in nego-
tiating treaty texts, in multilateral treaty negotiations, the United 
States is but one judicial system among many.  Foreign courts are 
hardly bound by the interpretive guidance of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and treaty partners have their own domestic interpretive de-
mands to fulfill.241  Under the circumstances, it would be surprising if 
instrumental influences of this sort were the primary expected judi-
cial function in treaty interpretation. 
The Supreme Court has a long history of vigorous engagement in 
treaty interpretation, beginning aggressively in the era of the found-
ing of the United States.242  But if not as faithful agent, and if not with 
purely instrumental goals in mind, what is the Court’s understanding 
of its role in interpreting treaties?  Put differently, what is the nature of 
the judicial power such that it extends to foreign relations law at all? 
III.  EXPLORING A FORMAL THEORY OF JUDICIAL POWER FOR 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
Given the seeming inadequacies of primary theories of the judicial 
interpretive power to address the standard challenges of foreign rela-
tions law, the final part of this Article begins to explore theoretical 
frameworks that might avoid the failures of faithful agent theory in 
 
241 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, setting forth detailed 
rules for the interpretation of treaties, has been ratified by 110 nations.  See Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20.  The United States has signed but 
not ratified the treaty.  Id.  Nonetheless, the U.S. Department of State has on occasion 
acknowledged the Vienna Convention as “the authoritative guide to current treaty law 
and practice.”  RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 134 (2008) (quoting 
Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000)).  The U.S. Su-
preme Court has not seemed much interested in the Vienna approach since the treaty 
entered into force in 1980.  See id. at 133-38 (analyzing whether the Supreme Court’s 
treaty-interpretation practice diverges from the Vienna rules).  
242 See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations:  A Histori-
cal Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498-99 (2007) (noting that the U.S. gov-
ernment won less than twenty percent of cases between 1789 and 1838 in which a treaty 
was the basis of a claim or defense); see also supra subsection I.A.1 (reviewing multiple 
cases in which the Court asserted independent authority to interpret treaty obligations). 
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this realm and fill in the gaps left by purely instrumental approaches.  
Here called equilibrium theory, this emerging model draws both on 
traditional justifications for judicial supremacy in constitutional inter-
pretation and on scholars’ attempts to reconcile formal notions of the 
separation of powers with the advent of the administrative state.  In 
brief, the claim is that part of the judicial power is to promote the se-
paration of powers.  This Part first introduces the basic idea.  It then 
considers the principal objection to the approach:  in particular, the 
formal claim that the executive has its own interpretive power that 
must be taken into account in any understanding of shared interpre-
tive authority.  Throughout, this Part considers what such a view of the 
judicial duty would contribute to our understanding of deference in 
current dilemmas in statutory and treaty interpretation. 
A.  Equilibrium Theory 
It is hardly new to suggest that the Supreme Court has a role to 
play in preventing the accrual of excessive power in any one branch of 
the federal government.  Such a duty has been understood to emerge 
from a range of constitutional sources, from general principles of the 
separation of powers to specific guarantees of individual rights in the 
text.243  Indeed, the argument that it is a core judicial function to po-
lice structural boundaries to constrain power is a central justification 
of Marbury itself: 
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to 
different departments, their respective powers.  It may either stop here; 
or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. 
 The government of the United States is of the latter description.  The 
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits 
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.  To what 
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation com-
 
243 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (“The very 
choice of which portion of the power to exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the 
standard that Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legis-
lative authority.  Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the 
courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.”); Mi-
stretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“This Court consistently has given 
voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution 
that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three 
coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.”); Duncan v. Kahana-
moku, 327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946) (“Courts and their procedural safeguards are indis-
pensable to our system of government.  They were set up by our founders to protect 
the liberties they valued.”). 
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mitted to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those in-
tended to be restrained?  The distinction, between a government with 
limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine 
the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts 
allowed, are of equal obligation.
244
 
Of significance here, Marbury’s message in this regard is not li-
mited to constitutional interpretation but extends to statutory and trea-
ty interpretation as well.245  This understanding should be unremarka-
ble.  The text of Article III makes it clear that the “judicial power” 
extends without distinction to the Constitution, statutes, and trea-
ties.246  It is not immediately apparent why that power, to the extent it 
includes any interpretive authority, would not be exercised in largely 
the same way from one instrument to the next. 
To the extent modern scholars have challenged Marbury’s concep-
tion of judicial power in this regard—and challenged it they have—
their concerns have focused principally on the particular dilemma of 
constitutional interpretation.  The contemporary constitutional theory 
commonly labeled “departmentalism,” for instance, holds that “each 
branch, or department, of government has an equal authority to in-
terpret the Constitution in the context of conducting its duties” and 
“is supreme within its own interpretive sphere.”247  Drawing on textual, 
structural, and historical claims to shared interpretive authority, de-
partmentalists have advanced a range of reasons the political branches 
should be understood to have at least some power to interpret for 
themselves the meaning of the Constitution, including its structural 
grants of authority.248  For these scholars, the principal objection to 
 
244 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803); see also N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) (“The Federal Judiciary 
was therefore designed by the Framers to stand independent of the Executive and Leg-
islature—to maintain the checks and balances of the constitutional structure . . . .”), 
superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.  
245 See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 2 (“Marshall’s grand conception of judicial 
autonomy in law declaration was not in terms or in logic limited to constitutional 
interpretation . . . .”).  
246 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cas-
es . . . arising under this Constitution, laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made . . . .”). 
247 Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation:  Three Objections 
and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 782-83 (2002). 
248 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 105-10 (2004) (noting that 
departmentalism squares with founding-era ideas about “popular constitutionalism”); 
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 6-32 (1999) (ar-
guing against judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation); WHITTINGTON, su-
PEARLSTEIN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011  11:53 AM 
838 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 783 
Marbury’s assumption of judicial supremacy is the countermajoritarian 
one:  of all branches, why should the nondemocratic Court have the 
power to say what our democratic Constitution means, particularly as 
it is so difficult to amend the Constitution democractically (as the 
Constitution itself provides)?  Why should the Court be allowed effec-
tively to end the debate on constitutional meaning? 
For reasons that should be apparent, judicial interpretation of sta-
tutes and treaties poses less troubling democratic concerns.  If Con-
gress does not like the Court’s interpretation of a statute, whether 
based on a substantive canon of interpretation or on some other rea-
son, it can pass another one.  If Congress does not like the Court’s in-
terpretation of a treaty, it can pass a subsequent statute, effectively 
overturning whatever interpretation the Court has given the treaty.249  
Indeed, as instrumental theories of judicial power suggest, judicial in-
terpretation of statutes and treaties can serve an eminently democratic 
function, not only by compelling the lawmaker to clarify meaning 
through a public and deliberative process, but also by infusing laws 
with judicial values of stability and consistency.250  Such a function is 
likely to be particularly valuable in certain foreign relations contexts, 
where executive branch secrecy can challenge the effectiveness of 
congressional oversight. 
For statutes and treaties, then, the more significant challenge to 
the Marbury view of interpretive authority—a view that assumes some 
judicial role in limiting government power—is less a question of which 
single branch should play the role of interbranch enforcer.  Instead, it 
is the challenge of identifying what those formal authorities are, or 
could be, in the modern administrative state.  If executive agencies 
are to carry out both quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative functions, 
then an interpretation of Marbury (or anything else) that would con-
template the enforcement by any branch of a strictly formal division of 
 
pra note 205, at 30 (noting that Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and 
Reagan articulated departmentalist views); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous 
Branch:  Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 223 (1994) (arguing 
that the veto, pardon, and appointment powers, among others, reflect the executive’s 
broad mandate to interpret the Constitution); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled 
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 687 (2005) (“[T]he 
Constitution’s grant of executive power, together with the duty faithfully to execute 
the laws, means that the executive and Congress acting in their own spheres must in-
terpret and apply the Constitution.”); Whittington, supra note 247, at 783 n.42 (noting 
that the concept of departmentalism arose in debates among the Founders).  
249 See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 209 & nn.129-31 (describing the ability of legisla-
tion to supersede treaty provisions).  
250 See supra Section II.B (discussing instrumental interpretation in further detail).  
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powers—executive power to the executive, legislative power to Con-
gress, and so forth—cannot survive. 
Yet the notion that federal power may be effectively limited only 
by, for example, preventing the executive from issuing any kind of 
legal rule (lest it be accused of legislating) was not necessarily the 
separation-of-powers concept the Framers had in mind or the limit 
Marbury itself necessarily contemplated.  Rather, as Cynthia Farina 
noted in the wake of Chevron, the Madisonian vision of separated 
powers was of a government of shared authority, with each branch 
possessing enough constitutional power “to resist encroachments of 
the others.”251  Allowing one branch to accrue functional authority 
over time in the service of effective governance was thus permissible 
as long as the other branches could respond with equal and opposite 
constraining forces of their own.  Delegation of legislative power to 
the executive could be tolerated under this scheme, as long as it re-
mained possible to maintain an offsetting power through indepen-
dent judicial interpretation.252  In this respect, the problem with Che-
vron was that it disabled that system of “dynamic equilibrium,” 
depriving the courts of their full power of interpretation just when 
the need to preserve equilibrium was greatest.253 
If this view of the modern consequences of Marbury is correct—
that is, the view that part of the judicial role is to help maintain inter-
branch equilibrium—it holds several implications for statutory and 
treaty interpretation that make it a useful supplement to an instru-
mental approach.  First, like instrumental theory, the equilibrium view 
does not bar judicial consideration of an executive branch interpreta-
tion of a law, particularly insofar as the executive may enjoy expertise 
that might clarify legislative meaning.  But unlike instrumental theory, 
the equilibrium model carries clear implications for the relative 
weight due to substantive canons of interpretation—like the nondele-
gation canon—as compared with claims of executive deference.  Con-
temporary writings on whether the executive’s view or a judicial canon 
should trump in cases of statutory ambiguity commonly see the ca-
nons as flowing from some combination of functional interests in 
judicial prudence, institutional minimalism, and administrative utili-
 
251 Farina, supra note 17, at 497 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James 
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).  
252 See id. at 487 (“[T]he Court’s vision of separation of powers evolved . . . to the 
more flexible . . . proposition that power may be transferred so long as it will be ade-
quately controlled.”). 
253 Id. at 497-98. 
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ty.254  And if nondelegation canons are driven principally by functional 
concerns, then competing functional demands might trump the ca-
nons themselves—for example, the demand of deferring to executive 
expertise in foreign relations matters.255  If, however, nondelegation 
canons are a necessary adjunct to the formal judicial power to interp-
ret the law, then one might expect the Court to require at least a clear 
statement before it interprets a statute or treaty to effect the transfer 
or accretion of significant discretionary power.256  An equilibrium 
theory approach would embrace the latter view.  That is, when faced 
with ambiguity, the Court would give priority to interpretive canons 
that reduce the likelihood that any one branch would be barred from, 
or could shirk, continued participation in interbranch debate.  To ex-
tend the example from above, a court considering the scope of deten-
tion authority provided by the 2001 AUMF would adhere to the sub-
stantive canon against delegation before simply deferring to executive 
views on grounds of expertise.257 
Second, when a purely instrumental understanding of the judicial 
power seems an inadequate and therefore unlikely explanation for 
the Court’s active role in treaty interpretation, equilibrium theory 
 
254 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative 
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 76 (2008) (“[S]hould statutory ambiguity be resolved by 
courts applying normative canons, as it was previous to Chevron?  Or are these the kind 
of normative questions that should . . . be assigned to agency judgment?”); see also, e.g., 
Sunstein, supra note 230, at 315-16 (arguing that to the extent nondelegation doctrine 
remains of constitutional salience, it is enforced through the deployment of the inter-
pretive canons).  As noted previously, such canons have also been explained as a rea-
sonable outgrowth of the faithful agent view of judicial power.  See Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) 
(“‘[T]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in 
order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’  This approach not only reflects the 
prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also 
recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the 
Constitution.  The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to 
infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden 
it.” (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895))). 
255 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2102-06 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court has “made clear that delegation concerns are less significant when statutes con-
cern foreign affairs than when they concern domestic affairs”).  
256 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (“The very 
choice of which portion of the power to exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the 
standard that Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legis-
lative authority.  Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the 
courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.”). 
257 Note that Bradley and Goldsmith reach the opposite conclusion on the relev-
ance of the nondelegation canon to AUMF interpretation.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, 
supra note 23, at 2102-06. 
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would provide more meaningful guidance—leading the Court to dis-
favor constructions that disrupt interbranch equilibrium or otherwise 
enable the accretion of federal power through international law.  In 
this respect the Medellín Court, for example, might be understood to 
have acted appropriately to reinforce equilibrium by rejecting the ex-
ecutive’s argument that the ICJ’s judgment, although not binding in 
courts of its own authority, “became the law of the land with precisely 
that effect pursuant to the President’s Memorandum and his power 
‘to establish binding rules of decision that preempt contrary state 
law.’”258  Recall that the executive’s argument in Medellín was that the 
relevant treaties should be read to “implicitly” give the President the 
power to implement the United States’ “treaty-based obligation” to ef-
fect compliance with the ICJ’s decision.259  Rejecting the executive’s 
proposed reading, the Court demanded a clearer statement—in the 
treaty or, perhaps more sensibly, from Congress itself—that this was 
indeed the desired effect.  Absent such a statement, the Court would 
not permit the executive to claim a power, by treaty, to “convert[] a 
non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one.”260 
Equilibrium theory could also counter trends in international law 
and legal structures that may tend to increase the relative power of 
domestic executives within domestic legal structures.261 Here, the 
Court’s per curiam decision in Munaf v. Geren262 should stand as a cau-
tionary tale.  In Munaf, the Court was reluctant to “second-guess” the 
executive’s determination, based on close coordination between the 
U.S. State Department and the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, of the likelih-
ood that two U.S. citizens would face torture if transferred to Iraqi 
custody.263  The executive argued that such second-guessing “would 
require federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and 
undermine the Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this 
 
258 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008) (quoting Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 5, at 5); see also supra subsection I.A.1 (discussing Me-
dellín and related cases).  
259 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, su-
pra note 5, at 11) (emphasis omitted). 
260 Id. 
261 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Globalization and Executive Power 28 (Apr. 4, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“[G]lobalization generally has 
resulted in a net gain in power not for judiciaries, but for the “political” branches—
and above all for executives—within domestic legal systems.”); Scheppele, supra note 
30, at 3-5 (describing how national executives have used a series of UN Security Coun-
cil antiterrorism resolutions to expand executive power domestically).   
262 553 U.S. 674 (2008); see also supra subsection I.A.2 (discussing Munaf).  
263 Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702. 
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area.”264  While the Court ultimately declined to reach directly the sta-
tutory and treaty interpretation questions that underpinned the ha-
beas petitioners’ request for relief,265 a view that it is part of the judi-
cial duty to promote interbranch equilibrium would likely require the 
Court to take a more active interpretive role. 
B.  Considering Formal Objections 
As noted above, a view of the judicial power that affords the Court 
a formal role in promoting interbranch equilibrium would tend to 
trump the functional considerations of expertise on which most theo-
ries of executive deference are based.266  For this reason, the most po-
werful arguments against an equilibrium theory of judicial power in 
foreign relations law are based not on the executive’s functional ex-
pertise, but rather on formal claims about its Article II power.  Article 
II offers the executive several fonts of authority, including the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause and the Treaty Clause, that may afford the 
President interpretive power in foreign relations matters that is not 
otherwise implicated in standard administrative law.267  Yet while there 
is a good case to be made that the executive must have some inherent 
power to interpret statutes and treaties, it is far from clear that this 
power entitles the President to any more deference than federal agen-
cies enjoy under Skidmore.268  Because an equilibrium theory under-
standing of judicial power poses no bar to the consideration of execu-
tive branch interpretations to this extent, recognizing some formal 
interpretive power in the executive may be broadly compatible with 
the judicial role described here. 
Scholars have regularly argued that judicial deference to executive 
interpretations of foreign relations–related statutes and treaties is ne-
cessitated in part by the President’s own formal constitutional authori-
 
264 Id. 
265 See id. (finding that habeas petitioners had not successfully raised the claims in 
the lower courts).  Petitioners had argued that transfer would violate their rights under 
a federal statute and treaty prohibiting the “return” of someone to another state when 
there is a substantial likelihood he will be tortured.  Id. (citing Foreign Affairs Reform 
and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-822, and 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, supra note 120). 
266 See Pearlstein, supra note 174, at 1572 (arguing that while functional consid-
erations may be relevant in separation-of-powers disputes, clear formal constraints 
remain important).  
267 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–3.  
268 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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ty.  In the statutory context, for example, Professors Bradley and 
Goldsmith have maintained that the executive should have fairly 
broad power to construe its “necessary and appropriate” authority un-
der the 2001 AUMF, a statute that, as noted above, is now the subject 
of much judicial debate.269  In addition to suggesting various reasons 
that the executive might be entitled to judicial deference, Bradley and 
Goldsmith contend that the executive’s formal constitutional authori-
ty over foreign relations renders interpretive canons disfavoring broad 
delegations of power less salient.270  Citing cases such as Loving v. Unit-
ed States, in which the Court upheld the President’s authority under 
the UCMJ to prescribe aggravating factors for death penalty sentenc-
ing in courts-martial, the authors posit that “‘[t]he delegated du-
ty . . . is interlinked with duties already assigned to the President by ex-
press terms of the Constitution, and the same limitations on 
delegation do not apply where the entity exercising the delegated au-
thority itself possesses independent authority over the subject mat-
ter.’”271  Further, and more to the point, the authors contend, because 
the nondelegation doctrine is itself less of a concern, so too should be 
the nondelegation interpretive canon requiring a clear statement before 
assuming Congress intended to authorize a broad delegation of pow-
er.272  Thus, while a statute delegating general power to the President 
to take certain action whenever it is “necessary and appropriate” might 
ordinarily pose delegation concerns, in this view such delegation con-
cerns in the foreign relations context neither render the statute invalid 
nor even require that Congress clarify its intention before a court may 
interpret the statute’s scope as broadly as the executive demands.273 
One need not reject entirely the belief that the President has 
some formal authority to interpret and apply statutes to identify sever-
al reasons to doubt the ultimate persuasiveness of this claim.  For one, 
the Court’s reluctance to embrace nondelegation-doctrine challenges 
to executive actions pursuant to statutory authority may be less signifi-
cant to the scope of formal executive authority in foreign relations 
than Bradley and Goldsmith assume.  The modern Court’s lack of re-
ceptivity to substantive nondelegation challenges is hardly limited to 
 
269 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2084 & n.150 (suggesting, inter alia, 
that the executive might be entitled to Chevron deference). 
270 Id. at 2100-06. 
271 Id. at 2100-01 (emphasis added) (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 
772 (1996)).  
272 Id. at 2103-04. 
273 Id. 
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the foreign relations context.  As the Loving Court noted, “Though in 
1935 we struck down two delegations for lack of an intelligible prin-
ciple, we have since upheld, without exception, delegations under 
standards phrased in sweeping terms.”274  While cases such as Loving 
and Curtiss-Wright may have once seemed notable and foreign rela-
tions–specific exceptions to an otherwise broadly applicable rule 
against recognizing broad delegations of legislative power, it should by 
now seem clearer that these cases are only a few examples of a far 
broader rejection of nondelegation challenges, entirely independent 
of questions of formal executive power in foreign relations. 
Beyond this, in many of the cases Bradley and Goldsmith cite in 
support of their claim that the courts recognize that the executive’s 
formal powers in foreign relations may flip standard canons of statu-
tory interpretation, the Court has focused on the executive’s relative 
functional superiority, not its formal authority.  The 1965 passport-
regulation dispute, Zemel v. Rusk,275 is a case in point.  There, the 
Court was called to consider a nondelegation challenge to a statute 
authorizing the Secretary of State to issue passports under rules pre-
scribed by the President; the Secretary had interpreted the statute to 
authorize the restriction of travel to Cuba.276  Paying modest attention 
(by Chevron standards) to the executive’s views—noting only that 
“[t]he interpretation expressly placed on a statute by those charged 
with its administration must be given weight”277—the Court rejected 
the nondelegation challenge.  Notably, its rejection was not couched 
in language evincing any concern for (or recognition of) some inhe-
rent formal authority of the executive but rather on the grounds that 
because of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary inter-
national relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to 
information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and 
acted upon by the legislature, Congress—in giving the Executive author-
ity over matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint with a brush 
broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.
278
  
 
274 Loving, 517 U.S. at 771 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)); see also 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327-29 (1936) (upholding the 
President’s delegated authority to impose an arms embargo).  
275 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
276 Id. at 4. 
277 Id. at 11. 
278 Id. at 17. 
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While there can be no question that the Court has taken such 
functional considerations into account in construing statutory delega-
tions of power to the executive and in resolving separation-of-powers 
questions more broadly, a recognition that such considerations may 
matter is a far cry from the position that the Court is compelled to 
take them into account by the executive’s authority under Article II.279 
Perhaps more importantly, it is a significant—and unwarranted—
conceptual leap to move from the (arguable) proposition that delega-
tion doctrine is broadly less salient when construing foreign relations 
statutes280 to the proposition that the interpretive canon against broad 
delegations should not apply, or the even broader proposition that 
 
279 The other cases in the “passport trilogy,” relied on heavily by Bradley and 
Goldsmith, are likewise unhelpful in advancing the claim that the President’s inde-
pendent constitutional authority has some particular bearing on the Court’s role in 
interpreting foreign relations statutes.  In Kent v. Dulles, the Court held that statutes 
providing that passports may be issued under “such rules as President 
shall . . . prescribe” did not afford the executive the authority it claimed—namely, the 
power to deny passports to citizens who appeared to support the Communist Party.  
357 U.S. 116, 123, 129 (1958); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2101 
(noting that the Kent Court declined to address whether a different analysis would be 
appropriate if the case had arisen during a war emergency).  To the extent one might 
discern anything about what difference wartime (and therefore “war powers”) might 
have made in the Court’s reasoning, it was a difference regarding the treatment of in-
dividual rights, not the relative scope of Congress’s power to delegate authority or the 
executive’s power to exercise it.  See Kent, 357 U.S. at 128 (distinguishing the instant 
case from the Court’s wartime holding in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944), on the grounds that “[n]o such showing of extremity, no such showing of joint 
action by the Chief Executive and the Congress to curtail a constitutional right of the 
citizen has been made here”).  In contrast, in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981), 
the Court did uphold the President’s delegated authority to revoke a passport on the 
ground that the holder’s activities abroad were causing serious harm to U.S. foreign 
policy.  But there, the Court squarely foreclosed the possibility that its delegation anal-
ysis was based on an assessment of the President’s Article II powers.  See Haig, 453 U.S. 
at 289 n.17 (“[W]e have no occasion in this case to determine the scope of ‘the very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as 
a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other go-
vernmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of 
the Constitution.’” (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
320 (1936))).  Rather, the Court’s decision was based on a finding that Congress was 
aware of and, by taking no action over time, implicitly authorized a consistent execu-
tive branch practice of denying passports on such grounds.  Haig, 453 U.S. at 302-03. 
280 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), the key case Bradley and Goldsmith 
cite for this proposition, did not purport to establish a principle of delegation in for-
eign relations law in general.  Rather, the case was narrowly limited to the Court’s un-
derstanding of the Commander-in-Chief function as including the particular responsi-
bility to take “action to superintend the military . . . ‘a specialized community governed 
by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.’”  Id. at 772-73 (quoting Orloff v. Wil-
loughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953)).  
PEARLSTEIN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011  11:53 AM 
846 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 783 
the Court’s role in interpretation may be appropriately ceded to the 
executive in this realm.  Indeed, even as the substantive nondelega-
tion doctrine has shriveled in importance in the modern administra-
tive state, the Court has paid sustained attention to the nondelegation 
interpretive canon.281  That the Court should prefer the interpretive 
canon as an approach to serving nondelegation interests in fact makes 
good sense.  The substantive doctrine and interpretive canon serve 
different purposes and have different effects.  A holding that Congress 
violates the separation of powers in overbroad delegations of authority 
to the President conclusively limits the government’s options.  The in-
terpretive canon allows Congress and the President the opportunity to 
pursue an arrangement of broadly delegated powers, but only if the 
effect of the arrangement is made clear through democratic delibera-
tion and clear legislative commitment.  Although the Court has largely 
declined to attach strong constitutional prohibitions to delegated-
power arrangements, that does not mean it has lost interest in pur-
suing separation-of-powers goals through less constitutionally “nuc-
lear” means.  Any reluctance the Court feels in applying the substan-
tive doctrine in the foreign relations context may not—and need 
not—carry over to its application of the interpretive canon. 
Given the limitations of such doctrinal arguments, the stronger 
claim that formal executive power may preclude adherence to equili-
brium theory in the interpretation of statutes and treaties may come 
by extension from the departmentalists, who maintain that the execu-
tive has at least some interpretive authority over the meaning of the 
constitutional law.282  Recall that departmentalism holds that “each 
branch, or department, of government has an equal authority to in-
terpret the Constitution in the context of conducting its duties” and “is 
supreme within its own interpretive sphere.”283  Based on textual, struc-
tural, and historical claims to shared interpretive authority,284 as well as 
on various strands of political theory including notions of popular con-
stitutionalism,285 the general idea may be succinctly summarized: 
 
281 See Sunstein, supra note 230, at 315-16 (arguing that nondelegation doctrine is 
“alive and well” in the form of substantive interpretive canons against delegation). 
282 See sources cited supra note 230. 
283 Whittington, supra note 247, at 782-83. 
284 See generally Paulsen, supra note 248 (surveying such arguments in favor of the 
President’s interpretive authority). 
285 KRAMER, supra note 248, at 31 (noting that communities once had a “credible 
interpretive voice when it came to the constitution”).  
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Just as, under Marbury v. Madison, the obligation to decide cases consis-
tently with the Constitution gives the Court the power and obligation of 
judicial review, so, too, the Constitution’s grant of executive power, to-
gether with the duty faithfully to execute the laws, means that the execu-
tive and Congress acting in their own spheres must interpret and apply the 
Constitution.286  
While it is certainly true that aspects of the departmentalist ratio-
nale are strongly tied to the unique task of constitutional interpreta-
tion287 and therefore are not necessarily instructive on the question of 
statutory and treaty interpretation at issue here, not all of the text-
based arguments for departmentalism are limited to the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution.288  Indeed, departmentalist reliance on the 
separation-of-powers idea that the power of interpretation is too im-
portant to be held exclusively by one branch cannot obviously be li-
mited to constitutional interpretation per se.289  It thus should not be 
surprising that some departmentalist scholars have suggested that their 
view of the executive’s formal interpretive authority extends to statutes 
and treaties as well.290  The “judicial power,”291 a term understood to en-
 
286 Pillard, supra note 248, at 687 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).   
287 Some departmentalists have pointed to the presidential oath of office, for ex-
ample, as a textual basis for understanding the President as having some independent 
constitutional responsibility to explain (in service of upholding) the Constitution.  
That Clause imposes upon the President the duty to “preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States,” not the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 266-67 (3d ed. 2000) (recognizing the importance of the 
Oath Clause in the departmentalist argument).  Other scholars have likewise made ar-
guments grounded in political theory that are tied specifically to the task of constitu-
tional interpretation. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 248, at 106-10 (discussing how the 
three branches of government should reach compromise when their interpretations 
differ); TUSHNET, supra note 248, at 6-32 (raising various arguments against judicial 
supremacy in constitutional interpretation). 
288 While the Oath Clause may make executive interpretive authority over the 
Constitution of special significance, the Take Care Clause makes no such textual dis-
tinction between different sources of federal law.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e 
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”). 
289 See Paulsen, supra note 248, at 222 (“The framers believed that liberty is best 
preserved where governmental power is diffused . . . .”). 
290 See, e.g., id. at 221 (“The Supreme Court’s interpretations of treaties, federal 
statutes, or the Constitution do not bind the President any more than the President’s 
or Congress’s interpretations bind the courts.”); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional 
Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation:  Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105, 113 (“[A]ll three branches share the 
responsibility to uphold the Constitution.”). 
291 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”).  
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compass an interpretive function, extends equally to the Constitution, 
statutes and treaties.  Why would the “executive power,” if understood 
to encompass any interpretive function, be construed differently? 
A weak version of the claim that the executive has some indepen-
dent authority to interpret statutes and treaties is not especially objec-
tionable.  The executive must have at least some power to interpret 
the law, if only enough to “take care” that the law is implemented in 
the (frequent) absence of a controlling judicial opinion.292  Whether 
the courts fail to resolve all interpretive questions because of structur-
al limitations293 or because of more prudential concerns,294 it is clear 
that not all statutes and treaties needing enforcement will be subject 
to judicial construction.  Indeed, this view seems unassailable in for-
mal terms, as one might readily imagine the constitutional require-
ment for the executive to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed 
includes the power to do what is practically necessary to execute the 
laws, including determining the law’s meaning.  At the same time, this 
kind of interpretive authority does not generally threaten the “judicial 
power,” a power limited by the express recognition that the federal 
courts will decide only those disputes concrete enough to constitute a 
case or controversy.295  Accepting that the executive has some interpre-
tive power of this sort does not imply an answer to the question of 
whether this power in foreign relations matters should preclude the 
Supreme Court from exercising a duty to apply its own interpretive 
power to preserve interbranch equilibrium. 
 
292 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Necessary and Proper:  
Executive Competence to Interpret Treaties, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 316, 325-28 (1990) (arguing 
that the executive must inevitably make judgments about what the law requires); Eu-
gene V. Rostow, The Reinterpretation Debate and Constitutional Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1451, 1455 (1989) (“[T]he President necessarily interprets and reinterprets every sta-
tute and treaty . . . .”). 
293 See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing the structure and jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts).  
294 Walter Dellinger and H. Jefferson Powell give an example of this concern:   
In 1800, Congressman Marshall explained to the House of Representatives 
that the Constitution does not vest in the federal courts the exclusive authority 
to decide issues arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties; while such 
issues are by definition questions of law, some of them are “questions of politi-
cal law,” and must be answered by one (or both) of the political branches of 
the government.” 
Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 367 
(1999) (quoting the Honorable John Marshall, Speech on the Resolutions of the Honor-
able Edward Livingston, Delivered in the House of Representatives (Mar. 7, 1800), in 4 
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 103 (Charles T. Cullen & Leslie Tobias eds., 1984)). 
295 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
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A stronger version of the departmentalist idea, however, chal-
lenges not only judicial exclusivity in interpretation, but also judicial 
supremacy:  the assumption that the Court necessarily wins the inter-
pretive battle of the branches.  In this view, where a particular power 
is textually committed to the executive alone, such as the power to is-
sue pardons or veto legislation, the executive should enjoy supremacy 
in determining how to interpret these powers.296  Some departmental-
ists contend that the President must thus have the authority to decline 
to enforce statutes he believes are unconstitutional.297  An even broad-
er view suggests that the President’s interpretive authority entitles him 
to refuse to comply with orders of the courts.298  While such claims 
remain a minority view,299 it is not difficult to imagine the implications 
of such a view for statutory and treaty interpretation:  if the executive 
can fully ignore laws he thinks tread on a matter within his exclusive 
constitutional power, then his interpretation of those laws should have 
some primacy even if only to avoid such a dramatic step.  Indeed, it is 
precisely this argument that John Yoo, among others, has advanced 
with respect to treaty interpretation—specifically, that the Constitu-
tion grants the President exclusive control over treaty interpretation by 
vesting the executive power in the President and by granting the Pres-
ident power to make treaties.300 
 
296 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 205, at 14 (describing a theory of “fixed depart-
mentalism” that holds that “‘allocation of interpretive authority varies by topic or con-
stitutional provision’” (quoting Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpre-
tation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 384 (1997))). 
297 See Johnsen, supra note 290, at 112 (noting that a few departmentalists argue 
that the President should choose not to enforce laws if he finds them “constitutionally 
objectionable”). 
298 See Paulsen, supra note 248, at 222 (arguing that the President “may refuse to 
execute (or, where directed specifically to him, refuse to obey) judicial decrees that he 
concludes are contrary to law”).   
299 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (challenging the idea that the 
courts’ interpretations of the Constitution do not bind nonjudicial authorities).  
300 See John Yoo, Politics as Law?:  The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of 
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 869-70 (2001) (book review) 
(contending that the Constitution imparts full control over treaty interpretation to the 
President).  Although Yoo’s position is set forth in the context of treaty interpretation 
specifically, his textual reading of Article II’s Vesting Clause would appear to have im-
plications for statutory interpretation as well.  See also Bradley, supra note 11, at 699 
(arguing that because the executive has broad constitutional authority of its own with 
regard to foreign affairs law, there should be little concern that shared authority—even 
shared interpretive authority—runs afoul of formal constitutional limits). 
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Yoo’s account is plagued by several flaws,301 not the least of which 
is that it is difficult or impossible to establish which, if any, of the ex-
ecutive’s foreign relations powers are exclusive.  The executive’s pow-
er to make treaties is coupled with the Senate’s power to ratify them.302  
The Constitution equally defines the “judicial Power” as extending to 
“all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made.”303  And the courts certainly have a long his-
tory of behaving as though treaty interpretation is a power shared with 
the judicial branch.304  With respect to the Commander-in-Chief pow-
er—arguably the most relevant formal duty “interlinked with” the sta-
tutory power contained in the AUMF—scholars have recently shown, 
in exhaustive detail, that Congress has historically been “an active par-
ticipant in setting the terms of battle (and the conduct and organiza-
tion of the armed forces . . .),” an assertion of shared power that the 
executive has most often accepted as within Congress’s authority.305  
Departmentalism may give the executive strong claims to formal in-
terpretive authority where it is clear his is the only source of constitu-
tional power, but wherever power is shared, as in the realm of foreign 
relations, the task of maintaining equilibrium seems relevant. 
 
301 For example, Martin Flaherty highlights the historical deficiencies of Yoo’s 
argument:   
[T]he framers were virtually of one mind when it came to giving treaties the 
status of law. . . . The imperative need to make treaties legally binding on both 
the states and their citizens was widely recognized by 1787.  The major conse-
quence of this perception was the ready adoption of the supremacy clause, 
which gave treaties the status of law and made them judicially enforceable 
through the federal courts. 
Martin S. Flaherty, Response, History Right?:  Historical Scholarship, Original Understand-
ing, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2120 (1999) 
(quoting Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle:  The Treatymaking Clause as a 
Case Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 233, 264 (1984)); see also Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the 
President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 194-95 (2004) (not-
ing that Yoo’s contention that treaty interpretation is solely within the executive realm 
is flawed, as the Constitution distributes power among all three branches); Michael P. 
Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1263, 1276-77 
(2002) (arguing, inter alia, that in light of the Framers’ understanding of the separa-
tion of powers, committing the power to “make” treaties to the executive would prec-
lude vesting the power to interpret them in the same branch).  
302 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“He shall have Power . . . to make Treaties, provided 
two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”). 
303 Id. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).  
304 See supra subsection I.A.1 (reviewing treaty-interpretation cases).  
305 David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947 (2008).  
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CONCLUSION 
In many respects, the tendency of scholars and courts to view trea-
ties and foreign relations statutes as a separate species of law is unfor-
tunate.  While it may have once been possible to draw a bright line be-
tween the tasks of governing that were purely domestic and those that 
arose uniquely in the realm of foreign relations, transformations in 
areas from international trade and communications to biology and 
warfare to international law and legal structures render the easy dis-
tinction between foreign and domestic power increasingly quaint.  
The Supreme Court’s active engagement with resolving foreign rela-
tions–related legal disputes in recent years may be seen as one manife-
station of this broader trend.  At the same time, considering foreign 
relations as a quasi-distinct body of law may continue to offer heuristic 
benefits.  Among these benefits is the opportunity to evaluate domi-
nant models of the judicial power against a particular set of examples 
that these models were not necessarily conceived to address.  This Ar-
ticle has suggested that one lesson of this evaluation is to require the 
development of some additional understanding of the role of the 
courts in law interpretation. 
Beyond such theoretical considerations, the question this Article 
addresses is one of intense practical concern over a novel question 
faced by contemporary courts:  in construing a statute authorizing the 
President to use “necessary and appropriate force” to battle interna-
tional terrorism, whose view of the meaning of “necessary and appro-
priate” controls?  By arguing for an equilibrium-promoting concept of 
judicial power, the intent here has not been to discount the many rea-
sons why the courts may wish to, and should, attend closely to the ex-
ecutive’s views.  The executive’s functional strengths—its access to bo-
dies of experts across the U.S. government and its experience in both 
applying the law on the ground day-to-day and applying its under-
standing of its own duties and political demands—make its views in-
disputably worth consideration.  Rather, the point of this Article is to 
argue that it is possible for the courts to take such insights into ac-
count without pretermitting their own interpretive exercise in cate-
gorical deference to any position the executive might take.  Indeed, 
this Article has contended that such categorical deference is not for-
mally required (as a matter of executive power) and may be formally 
prohibited (as a matter of judicial power). 
Given the practical concerns driving this inquiry, it is fair, in the 
end, to wonder whether such a conclusion—effectively leaving the 
courts to determine the extent to which the executive’s interpretation 
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has “the power to persuade”—is bound to leave the courts more con-
fused and less constrained than they already are.  It is an intriguing 
question for empirical study.  But the outcome is far from obvious.  
The courts are consistently in the business of conducting multifactor 
analyses in the style of Skidmore to determine whether a search was rea-
sonable, whether a defendant was afforded all process due, and a host 
of other inquiries.  The Skidmore factors that contribute to persuasive-
ness are themselves a finite set.  And in the end, the most meaningful 
constraints on the judicial power are most likely to come from the 
same powers that hold the executive and Congress in check:  the dy-
namic and ongoing struggle among the branches. 
 
